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ABSTRACT 
There has been increasing efforts, in recent years, by Maori to further restore customary use 
decision making rights. This has resulted in a continuing, and sometimes antagonistic, debate 
in New Zealand between 'preservationists and pro-harvesters'. However, the interested 
parties all have one key concern in common - a concern for the future well-being of the 
species. Maori express this concern in teons of providing the conditions for and maintaining 
a sustainable harvest while preservation lobby groups want this dealt with via the preservation 
ethic. Existing legislation such as the Wildlife Act 1953, is mostly interpreted so as to 
exclude Maori from decision making processes. Further, conservation legislation is 
interpreted from a preservationist perspective. However, New Zealand is signatory to, and 
has ratified. the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which supports the development 
of sustainable use. I examined the issue of customary use decision making rights from the 
Pakeha perspective of national and international policy. I argue that government, in order to 
act consistently with the CBD and Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi, will need to involve 
Maori in the decision making process. Development of a national biodiversity strategy, the 
responsibility of the Department of Conservation, is seen as one vehicle for advancing policy 
and understanding in this area. It is recommended that the Crown and lwi construct a 
process for the development of this strategy. Concurrently, government needs to facilitate a 
process to improve understanding between Maori and key preservation groups. I argue that 
unless some initiatives are taken soon many species' populations will continue to decline. 
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AUTHOR'S NOTE 
It is important to note at the beginning of this project that I am a Pakeha. I cannot and do 
not attempt to speak for Maori. However, having said this I would like to note that at 
times in this project the boundaries have not always been easy to identify or stick within. 
I have approached the customary use debate from the perspective that it is essentially a 
Pakeha problem. I have chosen to take this approach because I think that one of the main 
problems is that currently the Crown holds all of the decision making power. In exercising 
this power it has excluded and alienated Maori from decision making processes with 
regard to the availability of materials for . customary use. Further, DOC in its 
interpretation and administration of the Conservation Act 1987 has failed to give effect to 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi to the· extent necessary to satisfy many Maori 
lobbyists. 
I have reviewed the work of Moller who has focused on the ecological side of the 
customary use debate and am aware of current research by Manaaki Whenua into Maori 
perspectives on this issue. I hope that my work will be able to complement the work of 
these researchers and help advance the political side of the debate a little further. 
Although I have tackled the problem from a Pakeha perspective I hope that the project 
will still be of interest to Maori and to others with an interest in the customary use debate. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Since their arrival in Aotearoa New Zealand, Maori have harvested indigenous plants and 
animals. Article II of the Treaty ofWaitangi guaranteed Maori the right to continue to decide 
on the availability of indigenous species for harvest. However, since European colonisation 
many of these harvest rights have been withdrawn and Maori have been excluded from 
decision making processes. In . recent years some Maori have sought to further existing 
decision making rights to use some species of flora and faunal. Desire by Maori to renew this 
long standing practice has come to be known by Pakeha as customary use. Customary use in 
this context is "the harvest of wild animals and plants by Maori for spiritual. social and 
cultural reasons" (Moller, 1995b) . 
. The kuaka [bar tailed godwit; Limosa Zapponica baveria] is a transmigratory bird which 
spends Northern Hemisphere winters on Southern Hemisphere harbours. Traditionally the 
flesh of the kuaka was an important article of food for Maori. However. beside its 
importance for survival. harvest of the bird was a1so important for spiritual and cultural 
reasons. It is no longer necessary for Maori to harvest as a means of essential sustenance. 
However, it is argued by some such as King (1994) that the right to decide on the availability 
of species for harvest is a key of ensuring that the traditional culture lives on. 
IFor example. the historic practice of harvesting titi [muttonbird; PufJinus griseus Gmelin] from the Titi 
Island in Fouveaux Strait is a legally recognised customary use. Harvesting is carried out by SOme Ngai Tahu 
who have ancestral birding rights. 
The Department of Conservation (DOC) currently holds all of the decision making power on 
the availability of materials for customary use. Despite the need to 'give effect to the 
principles' of the Treaty of Waitangi', DOC's interpretation of both the Wildlife Act and the 
Conservation Act 1987, have been largely interpreted so as to exclude Maori from customary 
use decision making. Further, existing legislation is being interpreted from a preservationist 
perspective. This is occurring in a political environment in which the need to recognise and 
t 
provide for the Treaty and embody Maori values in conservation management has been 
accorded little weight. 
Efforts by Maori to further restore customary use decision making rights has developed into 
an emotional and sometimes antagonistic debate between 'pro-harvesters' and 
'preservationists'. The first group. made up of both Maori and Pakeha, calls for a greater 
recognition of Maori to be involved in customary use decision making processes. The second 
group, made up of conservationists, such as the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society 
(RFPBS), argues that native birds should remain "absolutely protected" and that DOC should 
continue to hold exclusive decision making rights on materials available for customary use2• 
The issue has now been formally referred to the New Zealand Conservation Authority 
(NZCA). The NZCA have been asked by the Minister of Conservation to look at wa:ys of -
achieving conservation objectives which also recognise the concerns of Maori for natural 
taonga. 
2The RFPBS is a strong political conservation group. The society'S objectives are to preserve and protect the 
indigenous flora and fauna and natural features of New Zealand for their intrinsic worth and (or the benefit of 
all people. 
Underlying the debate the various parties have a common goal which is the sustainability of 
the kuaka. This is important with regard to New Zealand's international obligations. New 
Zealand is ~igt1atory to the Convention on' Biological Diversity (CBD)~ which promotes 
among other things. the sustainable use of biological resources. New Zealand is currently in 
the process. of developing a national biodiversity strategy. which to be consistent with the 
obligations imposed by the CBD, should lend weight to Maori initiatives to further their 
customary use decision making rights. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed Maori the "full. exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their possessions (taonga) so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the 
same in their possession". However, since 1840 the Crown has enacted legislation which has 
extinguished Maori customary use decision making rights. 
Customary use is a long standing practice and some Maori are now lobbying to have decision 
making rights further restored. This has met with strong opposition from preservationists 
who oppose these Maori initiatives. They in tum are lobbying DOC to ensure that Maori 
customaty use decision making rights are not restored. International agreements like the -
Convention on Biological Diversity, which encourages sustainable use, lend weight to Maori 
initiatives. 
Current management practices are not working and in many areas are leading to some 
species'decline. Existing national and intemationallegislatioo is largely interpreted so as to 
exclude Maori from customaty use decision making. It is argued by pro-harvesters such as 
Moller (1995) that further restoring Maori customary use decision making rights will have 
significant conservation benefits. 
The problem for government is that positive responses to these initiatives will likely incur the 
wrath of preservationists and will therefore be politically risky. Nevertheless, Maori have 
Treaty rights and the need to take this into account is being supported in New Zealand's 
courts. The problem lies therefore in developing a relationship between the Crown and 
preservationists which will provide the basis for negotiating a successful outcome with Maori. 
I will explore the customary use debate from the point of view that it is essentially a Pakeha 
problem. This is because currently the Crown holds all of the decision making power. I 
argue that in the administration of this power, they are failing to. accord enough weighting to 
the Treaty of Waitangi and hence to involving Maori in customary use decision making. 
Reference will be made to the kuaka because, as a transmigratory species, it brings an 
important international perspective to the debate. This is because it is unlikely that New 
Zealand can manage the kuaka as part of its indigenous fauna independently of international 
considerations, including the harvesting and other human impacts suffered by them away from 
New Zealand (New Zealand Ecological Society, 1995). 
1.3 Objectives 
The main aim of this report is to investigate the legal and ,institutional framework of the 
customary use debate in New Zealand, from a Pakeha perspective, with a view to progressing 
the current impasse. The debate will be amplified by the case of the kuaka. Within this aim 
are the following objectives: 
• to examine the background to the customary use decision making debate; 
• to analyse the arguments 'for' and 'against' the further restoration of Maori customary 
use decision making right~, and to identify any common ground between preservatiomsts 
and pro-harvesters; 
• to analyse the political and institutional framework governing customary use decision 
making; 
• to look at the integration of these ideas and see what implications this has for customary 
use decision making and policy; 
• to identify directions for future research and management considerations. 
1.4 Methodology 
This section describes the research approach adopted and the reasons for the selection of that 
approach. This project takes a practical approach to the customary use debate. A more 
theoretical approach was possible, however, it was considered that a practical approach 
allowed for a clearer picture of the main issues to be painted. It is also hoped that by taking 
this approach I have developed a project that is useful to both academics and non-academics 
interested in the customary use debate. 
A case study approach was taken to provide a fuller portrayal of the issue being investigated. 
The question of customary use covers a diverse range of flora and fauna. By focusing on only 
one species, kuaka, I was able to highlight relevant legislation and political institutions with 
respect to a practical scenario. The kuaka was selected as a case study because it is part of a 
wider claim by tangata whenua. Further, because kuaka are a trans-migratory species, it 
allows an interesting look at wider issues, particularly those involving international 
agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Multiple methods were used in this case study. The techniques selected were, a literature 
search, analysis of other relevant documentation and personal interviews. The latter two 
methods were seen as providing the best resource base because the small amount of literature 
available on the subject and the specific nature of my research meant this was the only way to 
get some of the necessary information on the topic. 
1.4.1 Documentation, and Literature Search 
The research process began with a broad examination of the literature on customary use. The 
search was limited by two main factors. Firstly, there was little formal literature on the topic. 
The issue of customary use appears to have only been discussed in any great depth after the 
release of the NZCA discussion paper Maori Customary Use of Birds. Plants and other 
Traditional Materials3 • Secondly, the primary sources of written information were from 
Forest and Bird Magazine and Maori Newspaper Publications. The literature presented by 
these two sources can usefully be divided into 'preservation' and 'pro-harvest' perspectives. 
Neither source had much room for a reasoned debate on the issue with predominantly only 
one side of the debate being focused on. Other literature examined inc1uded submissions on 
the NZCA discussion paper and case law. A full list of sources is contained in the reference 
list. 
3New Zealand Conservation Authority. 1994. Discussion Paper Maori Customary Use ~r Native Birds. 
Plants and Other Traditional Materials. Wellington. New Zealand. 
1.4.2 Personal Con'espondence 
Due to the lack of literature and the nature of the issue, personal correspondence was 
considered nece~sary. This provided specific' infonnation on areas such as the ·position of 
interest groups, the legal advice given to DOC, and the applicability of international 
agreements to New Zealand. This also allowed for the collection of recent infonnation (ie. 
submissions), clarification and amplification of the ideas gained from other sources and some 
personal insight into the issue. 
Ten people were contacted by mail in order to gain specific infonnation. An introductory 
letter was sent along with a set of individualised questions. A proposal was included with the 
letter enabling those contacted to better understand the nature of my research. The people 
selected were key individuals in relevant organisations such as DOC, the RFBPS, World 
Wide Fund for Nature-New Zealand (WWF-NZ), the New Zealand Fish and Game Council, 
the Maruia Society and the NZCA. They were selected because of the infonnation they could 
provide and in order to obtain institutional positions, insights and opinions. 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the kuaka and its importance to both Maori and Pakeha 
over time. It examines the legislative history with regard to the kuaka and outlines current 
policy. Finally it introduces international agreements including the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species. 
Chapter 3 outlines the arguments presented by pro-harvesters and preservationists regarding 
efforts by Maori to further restore customary use decision making rights. It provides a brief 
analysis of the debate before concluding with an identification of the common ground 
between the two parties. 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of political and institutional processes. It begins with an examination 
of DOC. It then looks at the legal debate surrounding the customary use decision making 
issue focusing on the relationship between the Wildlife Act and section 4 of the Conservation 
Act. Finally, it examines how the administration of national legislation fits with New 
Zealand's obligations as outlined by the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Chapter 5 represents an integration of. these ideas. It begins by evaluating possible 
management options that could be employed in response to the customary use debate. It 
concludes with a. recopuneridatipn on the best management option and a possible mechanism 
for developing and implementing this. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the project. It begins by outlining 
the findings of this report. It then looks at the implications of this on future wildlife 
management and concludes with what this all means for the kuaka. 
CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND 
( 
2.1 The Kuaka4 
The kuaka breeds in Siberia and Alaska. When the northern nesting season is over, the bird 
flies south on migration, migrating through South East Asia and the Western Pacific Islands 
to Australasia. It is the most common of the migratory waders to reach New Zealand with 
between 80,000-100,000 arriving annually in the 1980s and 1990s (Sagar, OSNZ Wader 
Counts i. It can be seen on wetlands and coastal margins the length of the country and 
regularly reaches the Chatham Islands. Most kuaka arrive in New Zealand in 
OctoberlNovember and depart again in Marchi April. The birds arrive here undernourished 
and fatigued but after six months resting and feeding are in prime condition by the time they 
leave. Some non-breeding birds (mostly juveniles) remain to spend the winter in New 
Zealand. 
The kuaka is of mediwn size (approximately 40cm) and can be distinguished by a slightly 
upturned bill and its long legs. The birds can be found in small groups of 6 to 12 but are 
usually found in substantial nwnbers, often in thousands. The birds act almost in unison as 
they move from one feeding ground to another, feeding and resting being their only concern. 
Kuaka feed around mudflats, harbours and estuaries. 
4Unless otherwise referenced. 2.1 has been summarised from Soper, 1984. 
S As the bulk of the population winters in Australasia, it has been worked out that the total World population 
of this sub-species is probably less than 150,000 (Crossland, 1993, p36). 
Kuaka are protected in both their wintering and breeding grounds. However, they have lost a 
lot of habitat through the drainage and modification of their breeding grounds, and the 
pollution. dis~bance, and development of e~tuaries in their wintering gro~nds. The birds are 
also still hunted in some Asian countries such as, Hong Kong and Thailand (National 
Archives; Govey I, pers. comm.). 
2.2 A Maori Claim 
Tangata whenua have traditionally used indigenous natural resources for many centuries. 
These resources are intrinsic to Maori culture. Traditionally the flesh of the kuaka was an 
important article of food for Maori. A kuaka's puta or resting place. when discovered, was 
regarded as the property of the finder and trespass might be followed by severe punishment or 
even bloodshed (Oliver, 1930). 
In pre-pakeha times there were two main ways of catching kuaka: 
1. The birds were caught with long flax nets, stretching hundreds of yards, not unlike 
modem fishing net. At low tide, before the birds arrived, nets would be laid out on the 
sandbars where the birds fed. Nets were covered with a film of sand to disguise their 
presence. As the birds fed and walked over the net, their feet became entangled. This 
could mean a harvest of hundreds from just one session; 
2.A net was placed across the flight paths kuaka used. They were easy victims at times 
because of their routine of flying close to the ground on windy days (adapted from Fox, 
1994). 
ltl 
When the Europeans arrived the gun superseded the snare and net technology. The kuaka 
was considered fine eating when in good condition and as well as being shot by Maori kuaka 
were shot as a game bird by Europeans. until their legal protection hi 1941. 
In New Zealand kuaka are the main wader traditionally taken by Maori and are among several 
native birds which are 'illegally hunted,6 for food and sometimes for profit: 
... taking birds for profit is. and has been, rife for years. They and anything else that can be taken are a 
common source for pub raffles (Ormand Y, pers. comm.)7. 
'Illegal hunting' continues and because of the government's inability to adequately address 
Treaty issues. decision making in some key conservation areas throughout the country is 
being challenged by Maori (Mutu. 1994). For example. Crown ownership and management 
of indigenous flora and fauna has .been challenged by representatives of several iwi in the 
Waitangi Tribunal Claim Wai 262. Among other things they claim that "te tino rangatiratanga 
o te lwi Maori incorporated and incorporates decision-making authority over the 
conservation; control of, and proprietorial interests in natural resources, including indigenous 
flora and fauna" (Waitangi Tribunal. 1992, pI). 
2.3 A Legal History8 
The road to protection for kuaka has been fraught with debate. Kuaka shooting became 
controversial with the passage of the Animals Protection Act 1908, which totally protected 
IlWhile the Crown. its agents and preservationists refer to current use by Maori as 'illegal' many Maori claim 
that they are in fact only exercising their customary use righls as guaranteed to them under the Treaty of 
. Waitangi (Mason M. pers. comm.). 
7Yic Ormand is a former Tauranga Acclimatisation Society Ranger. 
8All points unless otherwise referenced are from the National Archives; Govey Ian, pers. comm. 
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the bird. The Acclimatisation Societies objected and the Minister of Internal Affairs agreed 
that protection was not justified, conceding that it had, " ... probably been included in the 
protected list by mistake," and further, he even tHought there was no reason, "' ... why the 
closed season every third year should not be abolished". 
Under the Animals Protection and Game Act 1921-22, kuaka was listed as native game. An 
open season of a maximum three months was specified. No bag limit was imposed, and 
kuaka could be taken under a general game licence or a special licence at a reduced fee. Very 
few of those special licences were ever sold9• In 1934. as the result of a RFBPS campaign, 
the game season for kuaka in any district was reduced to 2 months and a bag limit of 20 birds 
was imposed. In 1938. the season was reduced to two weeks at the beginning of February. 
Various groups again encouraged the protection of kuaka, in particular~ the RFBPS, the 
Akarana Maori Association. and the Department of Internal Affairs, but the Societies still 
thought this a backward and ill-advised move (McDowall. 1994~ RFBPS, 1995). 
From the beginning of the 1930s, there was a general move toward the protection of 
migratory waders in New Zealand. by including them with the protected native birds resident 
here all year round. It was known that the method of shooting kuaka and other waders in 
large flocks as they came to roost led to the injury of many birds. It was noted that many 
other birds flocked with kuaka. including other protected species and possibly rare visiting 
birds to this country. Shooting into such flocks also meant that there was little skill or sport 
involved as individual targets could not be picked out. The remarkable migration of kuaka 
9The Nelson Society, for instance. only sold between four and eight godwit shooting licences per year during 
the 1920s. 
I' 
from Siberia was also recognised as a factor that should be taken into account in offering 
them protection in New Zealand . 
. In 1940, the Minister of Internal Affairs announced the proposal to protect kuaka as a 
Centennial gesture, and asked sportspeople to forego hunting them that year. The growing 
movement to protect them internationally was noted, and the Minister stated that he would 
not like New Zealand to lag behind other countries in this. 
In the 1950s the Acclunatisation Societies sought to have kuaka relisted on the game 
schedule. They failed after a careful study into their biology and conservation status by 
several scientists of the day, including eminent ornithologists Falla and Turbott (RFBPS, 
1995). For this migratory bird, it _ was considered the stresses of long distance migration, 
natural predation in their breeding grounds from skua [stercorarius parasiticus] and Arctic 
fox [Alopex lagopus], loss of habitat, pollution and disturbance meant that protection from 
hunting in New Zealand was essential for their ongoing survival. 
In New Zealand kuaka have been totally protected since 1941 and are currently "absolutely 
protected"IO under the Wildlife Act 1953. Schedules to the Act dictate the type of protection 
. afforded to wildlife. This then indicates the availability of the species for harvest. For 
example, any wildlife not on a Schedule are fully protected (this includes kuaka), wildlife on 
Schedule 3 can be killed subject to the Minister's notification and wildlife on Schedule 1 are 
considered to be game. In·~ummary the Act makes it an offence,'.unless otherwise permitted, 
to kill, move, liberate, hold or disturb any protected species. 
IOEven though the bird is afforded "absolute protection" section 53 of the Wildl({e Act states that the 
Director-General can still permit the bird to be killed for certain purposes, see Appendix One. 
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In addition, section 4 of the Conservation Act 1987, requires the Department of Conservation 
to give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Historically, legal advice to DOC 
has been that this provision should not be'read into the implementation' of the Wildlife Act. 
However, based on the 1995 Court of Appeal decision in the Kaikoura Whalewatch case, it 
appears that DOC has been viewing its responsibilities with regard to section 4 of the 
Conservation Act too narrowly. As a result of the Court of Appeal decision, I argue that 
section 4 of the Conservation Act must now be applied to any decision made under the 
Wildlife Act. This is likely to have far reaching consequences with regard to the way DOC 
carries out its decision making responsibilities. 
So far DOC, which has the primary decision making responsibility for customary use, has no 
official national framework or policy on this issue. Some regional conservancies have tried to 
address customary use decision making issues in their Conservation Management Strategies 1 I. 
For example, the Northland Conservancy set up a "cultural materials committee (Te Pataka 0 
Te Taitokerau) whose role is to assist the Regional Conservator in reaching a decision on 
how legitimate requests for cultural materials can be met" (DOC, 1995, P 147). Other 
conservancies have chosen to be silent on this key issue and prefer to leave it up to the 
Director-General of Conservation to qecide on any new customary use applications. 
DOC actively protects kuaka and has attempted prosecutions for 'illegal harvesting' under the 
Wildlife Act. For example, in Tauranga, DOC have had several successfu1 prosecutionsl 2 
(Onnand V, and Owen K, pers. comm.). However, in Northland, until recently most of those 
II A Conservation Management Strategy is a statutory doc~ment which implements general policies and 
establishes objectives for the integrated management of natural resources (including land and species) and 
historic resources. These strategies have not yet been approved for all regions. 
12These have involved confiscations of guns, boats. etc. (Owen K. pers. comm.). 
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prosecuted for hunting the kukupa have been discharged without penalties, making 
enforcement of the law difficult, if not impossible. A shortage of funds means that DOC has 
handed the responsibility for prosecutions to the police. The police have tended not to 
emphasise scientific evidence relating to the birds' survival, nor have they shown any 
inclination to contest evidence given by defendants on the cultural reasons for their 
expeditions. In these circumstances judges have been unwilling to convict (King, 1994, p28). 
Further, Owen K (pers. comm.), states that with Tauranga Harbour being such a vast 
(2 1 ,800ha) and expansive area it is difficult to apprehend poachers. Ormand V (pers. comm.) 
also notes that at Matakana Island, areas used by kuaka for roosting and loafing are close to 
marae. Unless caught by surprise, harvesters quickly head for the protection of the marae, 
where it is not possible for enforcement officers to enter on. This makes it difficult for 
enforcement officers working on poaching matters to apprehend the people concerned. 
For Maori, kuaka have a traditional and cultural significance over and above their importance 
as a food source. This has led to an increasing amount of Maori lobbying for the return of 
customary use decision making rights. This has been supported by developments in 
international legislation recognising the important role indigenous peoples play m 
environmental management. From this. comes the recognition that New Zealand needs to 
address customary use issues and further . involve Maori in decision making processes. As a 
result the issue of customary use has been formally referred to the NZCA. 
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2.4 The NZCA - Working Towards a National Policy 
In 1993 the Minister of COnservation asked the NZCA t'o develop policy regulating the way 
Maori could use native flora and fauna for customary purposes. The NZCA is a quango of 
community and sectional interests set up by the Conservation Law Reform Act 1990 to advise 
the Minister of Conservation on the management of New Zealand's natural heritage I 3. It is 
serviced by the Department of Conservation and has a wide range of tasks and statutory 
responsibilities as set out under sections 6B and 6C of the Conservation Act. The customary 
use initiative is one ofthe more high profile areas the NZCA is involved in. 
In May 1994, the NZCA released it's draft discussion paper. They received over 360 
submissions and the responses, both in written submissions and in various statements made in 
the public media, indicate a wide range of opinion. 
In response to considerable public interest and concern, the Authority decided to invite all of 
the major conservation and recreation groups, along with various other non-governmental 
organisations peripherally interested in this matter, to take part in an open discussion with 
Authority members. From this discussion three key points emerged: 
1. The extent to which the Authority has led a public debate, through a structured -
consultation process, was considered to be grossly inadequate in relation to the 
significance of the matter in question for all New Zealanders; 
2. The discussion paper was considered to be shallow; with some discussion group 
participants indicating it lacked adequate historical perspective and analysis of the present 
\3or the twelve member body, two Maori members were appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Maori Affairs. The local authority representative on the Authority was also Maori. Other members represent 
various non-governmental interest groups such as the tourism and farming industries and environmental and 
recreational lobby groups (Mutu, 1994). 
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situation, and of possible future options. The majority of participants clearly felt the 
paper had been written as an attempt to justify a pre-determined outcome, rather than as 
an 'issues and options" paper more appropriate for the purpose of constructive public 
discussion; 
3. The participants agreed the Authority should nonetheless continue to receive the public 
submissions sought by 31 March, but for no more than the purpose of enabling it to 
prepare a more comprehensive 'issues and options' discussion paper for a more formally 
structured public consultation process (New Zealand Fish and Game Council, 1995). 
This feedback is now being analysed, before the NZCA working group re-convene to assess 
the responses and consider a range of options. Another discussion paper (or papers) 
incorporating the major concerns, priorities and themes arising from the first stage of 
consultation, will then be developed to lead a second phase of public debate planned for late 
1995. 
In due course the NZCA will report to the Minister of Conservation on this issue. The 
Department of Conservation will also provide advice directly to the Minister. The Minister 
will then consult with his cabinet colleagues and decide whether changes are desirable. 
2.5 International Obligations 
As well as gaining importance in New Zealand the need for international co-operation with 
regard to protecting wildlife has been emerging. In the last 35 years there has been a 
dramatic increase both in the numbers of treaties designed to protect wildlife and in their 
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importance as a force for conservation14• This can be seen through the development of 
international agreements such as the Convention on International Trade of Endangered 
Spec'ies (CITES), the Convention on the Conservation of Migrafory Species of Wild Animals t 
(eMS) and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Further, the rights of indigenous people are also being supported internationally. For 
example, Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration and Chapter 26 of Agenda 21 both deal 
specifically with the way governments should co-operate with indigenous peoples (Pearce, 
] 994). The CBD also contains several articles recognising indigenous peoples rights. 
New Zealand ratified the CBD in September 1993 and it became international law in 
December 1993 (DOC, 1994, p4). The CBn marks an historic commitment by the nations of 
the world to conserve biological diversity, to ensure that biological resources are used 
sustainably and that the benefits of such use are shared equitably. The Convention is the first 
international agreement to cover all genes, species and ecosystems (IUCN, 1993, p.iv). 
The Convention contains a series of far-reaching obligations relateq to the conservation of 
biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components. Obligations on the sustainable use of 
biological resources are interwoven into several articles, and are also the specific subject of 
Article 10. Parties undertake to regulate or manage biological resources for conservation and 
sustainable use and to encourage the development of methods for sustainable use (ibid. p4). 
14International agreements. or treaties. are a primary source of international law and create binding rights and 
obligations between the states that are parties to them in accordance with their tenns (Wells; 1984. pI43). 
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The Convention is an instrument of soft law, an expression of principles or intentions that 
countries share. It does not contain legal obligations that could be enforced in a court of law 
in the event of non-compliance. 'However, the moral value of this instrument may be very 
high, especially as the CBn can be considered a manifestation of a broad consensus on the 
part of the world community (de Klemm and Shine, 1993). This means that as a signatory to 
the CBn New Zealand has agreed in principle to take upon itself an effort to conserve 
biodiversity and promote sustainable use. To achieve this, New Zealand needs to formally 
develop a national biodiversity strategy and incorporate this into the country's legal 
framework. 
de Klemm and Shine (l993) state "Treaties are essential where the species or population to 
be preserved or harvested is international" (p13). As kuaka are a trans-migratory species, it is 
worthwhile looking briefly at the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species, even 
though New Zealand is not a signatory to itl5 • Migratory species "have long been subjected 
to shooting and trapping on their migratory routes, but in the last two or three decades 
invidious threats of pesticide use and habitat degradation have become so serious as to make 
international co-operation to protect migratory species a vital necessity" (Lyster, 1985, 
p.xxii). The CMS was adopted in June, 1979 and entered into force on 1 November, 1983. 
·It is designed to protect species which cross national boundaries. However, the CMS has 
"suffered from the lack of sufficient Parties to cover the majority of species included in the 
Appendices and their migrati.on routes" (de Klemm and Shine, 1993, p13). 
15The godwit comes into consideration in the CMS as it is listed in Appendix II. migratory species whose 
conservation status requires. or would benefit from, the implementation of international co-operative 
Agreements. Given that godwits are absolutely protected in this country, DOC considers that New Zealand 
would gain very little from membership of this Convention (Govey I, pers. comm.). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Kuaka are a trans:migratory bird which spends' Northern Hemisphere winters on Southern 
Hemisphere harbours. The kuaka was traditionally an important food source for Maori but 
due to lobbying from conservation groups is currently "absolutely protected" under the 
Wildlife Act 1953. 
For Maori, kuaka have a cultural and spiritual significance beyond their value as a food 
source. Due to this there has been an increasing amount of Maori lobbying to further restore 
their customary use decision making rights. Their initiatives are supported by the CBO in 
which the sustainable use of natural resources is recognised as an integral part of biodiversity 
conservation. 
Maori initiatives to restore customary use decision making rights has led to conflict between 
presevationists who want species which are "absolutely protected" to remain so and Maori 
who wish to become involved in customary use decision making. The report turns now to the 
two sides of the debate. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND 
3.1 Introduction 
Many species and their supporting ecosystems are under increasing hwnan pressure. This is 
due to factors such as loss of habitat, predation from introduced species such as rats [Rattus 
sp], posswns [Trichosurus vulpecula], stoats [Merminea] and other pests and 'illegal 
harvesting' which have all helped to reduce New Zealand's indigenous biodiversity. Today, 
many species are only small fragments of their earlier populations and are continuing to 
decline. It has been argued by pro-harvesters that a way of halting this decline would be to 
involve Maori in wildlife management, iIi this instance, by further restoring Maori decision 
making rights to use kuaka. 
In New Zealand, conservation issues have figured prominently on the public agenda and since 
the 1980s there has been considerable growth in the support given to environmental groupsl6 
(Buhrs and Bartlett, 1993). This has allowed the conservation movement to develop 
professiona1 and poHtically skilled organisationsl7 (ibid). Among some of these groups there 
is powerful opposition to the further restoration of Maori customary use decision making 
rights. As a result, lobbyists, including the RFBPS, an internationally regarded conservation 
group, and often referred to as the preservation lobby, continue to place political pressure on 
government agencies such as DOC to put conservation first. 
16 For example, the RFBPS currently has over 60 000 members. 
17 For example. in 1985 the RFBPS had 9 people on their pay-role. In 1992, this had grown to 2'0. 
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The "natural resources of New Zealand, particularly the native plants and animals. have 
traditionally fonned an important cultural and spiritual part of the Maori way of life" (DOC, 
'1995b, p309). As a result. some Maori wish to further assert their traditional right to make 
decisions regarding customary use of wildlife that has come under government-regulated 
protection. The debate has revolved largely around protected birds. especially kereru 
[kukupa; woodpigeon; Hemiphaga novaseelandae Gmelin], parea [Hemiphaga 
novaeseelandiae chathamensis], toroa [Northern Royal albatross; Diomedea epomophora 
sanfordi] and kuaka (King, 1994), Unfortunately. the issue has become clouded by the 
debate between 'preservationists' and ·pro-harvesters,18. 
Most preservationists agree that the right to use native plants and animals fonns an integral 
part of Maori culture. However, they argue that this right does not extend to the harvest of 
"absolutely protected" species such as the kuaka. They further argue that customary use 
decision making rights should not be further restored to Maori but should remain the sole 
responsibility of the Department of Conservation. The lobbying efforts of these groups 
represents one of the main constraints on DOC performing in relation to their Treaty 
obligations, as outlined in section 4 of the Conservation Act. 
The debate between preservationists and pro-harvesters has tended to focus on whether -
harvesting could be ecological1y sustainable. I do not wish to become embroiled in this 
debate. I have reviewed the submissions of Moller (1995), the Maruia Society (1995) and 
Wright et al. (1995) and adopt their conclusion that customary use can be sustainable. In this 
chapter I will focus on the debate between preservationists and pro-harvesters regarding 
18 It is important to note that this is not a debate between Maori and Pakeha. There are many Pakeha who 
already practice "customary use" and others who support Maori in their stand for greater involvement in 
management and decision-making. 
22 
further restoration of customary use decision making powers to Maori. I will then provide a 
brief analysis of the debate before examining any common ground and the implications of this 
for future policy on the customary use issue. 
3.2 An Inherent Right 
3.2.1 A Question o/Intrinsic Value 
In the inherent right argument, preservationists claim that a kuaka' s right to exist overrides a 
Maori right to make decisions on customary use, This view is based on the belief that we 
should be protecting indigenous flora and fauna for its intrinsic worth, and has often been 
referred to as the 'European conservation ethic', For example, Buhrs and Bartlett (1993) 
state: "being a New Zealander has as much to do with the country's physical environment as 
it has with history and culture. Conservation of New Zealand's scenic and natural qualities 
thus has a cultural as well as an ecological significance" (P55). 
The need to protect kuaka because of their intrinsic value forms the basis of the preservation 
perspective which is: 
... centred on valuing ecosystems in a non-hierarchical way. In this sense, it does not place-humans 
above everything else. It recognises an intrinsic value in each component of ecological communities. 
It is central to this point of view that each component has a right to exist for its own sake, in this case 
as an element of New Zealand's remarkable heritage. This right is derived from the contribution made 
by each to the stability and diversity of its community. Thus. the right to exist overrides the human 
right to harvest (DOC, 1992. in Atkinson, 1993. p22). 
Based on this, preservationists argue that any Maori right to 4etermine the availability of a 
species for customary use, conflicts with the view that the bird has a right to exist 
independent of any value placed on it by humans and because of their contribution to 
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diversity. This right is considered to transcend the human right to harvest or even to disturb. 
This view is further supported by Smith (1994) who states: 
The 'simplicity of absolute protection, the comparative ease of enforcement, and the living success of 
wildlife refuges, sanctuaries and national parks suggest human societies are better suited to being the 
protectors of wildlife than the consumers (p32). 
However, arguing that the restoration of customary use decision making rights conflicts with 
the inherent right of the kuaka to exist is based on a preservationist interpretation of 'intrinsic 
value' . I do not believe that desire by Maori to have their customary use decision making 
rights restored means that they do not have an appreciation of 'intrinsic values'. As Buhrs 
and Bartlett (1993) state: "for Maori, everything in the natural world possesses life force or 
mauri. People are interdependent with the natural world and, as its descendants, are obliged 
to pay it respect and to protect its integrity" (P55). It could be argued that this view also. 
recognises a right of the bird to exist for its own sake. 
] believe that the issue raised by this argument is that a preservationist interpretation of 
intrinsic value involves protecting the intrinsic value of each individual kuaka within the 
population. ]n contrast, ] believe a Maori interpretation of intrinsic value involves protecting 
the intrinsic value of the kuaka population rather than each individual within it. 
3.2.2 A Treaty Right 
Pro-harvesters see customary usc as a traditional activity. They argue that Article II of the 
Treaty of Waitangi contains an inherent right of Maori to be involved in customary use 
decision making. This right has been largely extinguished through the imposition of 
protective legislation by the Crown. who justified it on ecological grounds as necessary to 
safeguard species. However, "the methods by which these legislative changes were wrought 
did not honour the Treaty because they did not involve a substantive Maori input into the 
decision making" (Moller, 1995, p2). 
Currently, the Crown holds all of the decision making power and is imposing their 
conservation values upon Maori. This is being supported by preservationists who are pushing 
for the continuation of this type of management. I argue that both the Crown and 
preservationists are denying Maori an 'inherent' right of rangatiratanga over their resources, 
then reflected in the right to be further involved in decisions on customary useJ9• 
3.3 A Conservation Ethic 
3.3.1 A Traditional Conservation Ethic 
Preservationists argue that Maori should not have their customary use decision making rights 
restored because they disagree that Maori have a traditional conservation ethic. As Smith 
(1994) states, "Maori are not natural conservationists and amongst some the denial of 
ecological realities is common" (P30). His argument has support from the works of Diamond, 
(1991) and Flannery (1995) who argue that the spread of Polynesians across the islands of the 
Pacific was followed by a wave. of extinctions. They state that nowhere was this impact 
greater than in New Zealand where Maori seriously depleted natural food resources in their 
first 600 years: 
... within a short time. much of the community had collapsed in a biological holocaust and some of the 
remaining community collapsed in a second holocaust following the arrival of the Europeans. The end 
result is that New Zealand today has about half the bird species that greeted the Maori and many of the 
survivors are either now at risk to extinction or else confined to islapds with few introduced 
19To put this in a comparable context, would you go to India and impose your dominant culture. ie. the notion 
that cattle should be killed and eaten, on their culture, and as a Pakeha would you want Indians to come here 
and say we cannot eat cattle (Hughey, 1994). . 
mammalian pests. A few centuries of hunting had sufficed to end millions of years of moa history 
(Diamond, 1991, pl35). 
In response to arguments that Maori do not have a 'conservation ethic', pro-harvesters argue 
that the "lessons of history have been learnt" (in Smith, 1994, p30). Today, a desire for the 
restoration of further customary use decision making rights is firmly grounded in the principle 
of sustainability. With the help of scientific knowledge Maori now understand far more about 
the dynamics of wildlife populations and pro-harvesters conclude that decisions on "modem 
day harvests will be sustainable"{ibid.). As Sir Tipene O'Regan points out: 
... under tikanga. Maori wildlife was not excluded from use under abstract principles. "It is the 
preservation for use. Conservation by Maori is the wise use of the reproductive capacity of the 
resource" (in Keene, 1994, p14). 
Pro-harvesters have also acknowledged that limitations may be imperative to preserve a 
species. As Moller (1995b) points out, restoring further decision making rights to Maori does 
not mean that they have to be exercised: . 
Preservationists have tacitly portrayed customary use to imply that a species would be harvested at all 
times and places .. .ln many instances it may boil down to who has the right to say no to harvesting. 
more than there being frequent or wide scale harvests being authorised by iwi. 
Again, this highlights that preservationists believe decision making rights should not be 
restored because it is necessary to protect every individual within the population, whereas 
Maori believe that it is the over-all sustainability of the population they needs protecting. 
3.3.2 An 'Illegal Harvest'? 
Preservationists argue that Maori have no conservation ethic, because despite lega1 
protection, 'illegal harvesting' is still being carried out. Although the nwnber of 'illegal 
harvesters' is not known, Ormand V (pers. comm.) believes that they would be numerous. 
?(\ 
· Harvests are mainly at night when there is a full moon. The shotgun and netting are the most 
common methods used (ibid.). As a result there are significant non-target impacts on other 
waders, mc1uding threatened species: 
In 1991, it became apparent that large numbers of birds were carrying injuries apparently sustained 
from gunshots. About 4% of godwits seen at Rangaunu and about 2% on Parengarenga and Houhora 
had leg injuries20. Enquires to several of the locals revealed that shooting and possibly netting was 
occurring on these harbours. The numbers of visibly injured godwits on these harbours at the end of 
March was approximately 300. Many more would have died through damaged wings and internal 
injuries. Injured birds are effectively lost from the population because of their inability to breed, in 
spite of migrating in some instances. Shooting godwits is not a selective way of obtaining birds for 
food, it involves injuring other birds including species that may be threatened. Several species of birds 
are affected either directly through sustaining losses or injury or indirectly through disturbance (Pierce, 
1991). 
] argue that if Maori customary use rights were further provided for, it is likely that there 
would be less non-target· impact on other·birds as harvesters, if there were any, would likely 
use more appropriate methods. It could also be argued that there would be less impact on 
other species because a regulated Maori harvest may be smaller than current 'illegal' takes. 
Further, Maori may choose not to harvest any kuaka at all. 
Preservationists further argue, that iwi should take responsibility for their people, by placing 
restrictions on the harvesting of birds. However, preservationists have disregarded the fact 
that Maori have been excluded from any involvement in decision making. As a result, I 
argue that it is therefore the responsibility of the Crown to protect birds from these 'illegal 
harvesters'. It can further be concluded that iwi would be more likely to place restrictions on 
the harvest of birds if they a personal or tribal incentive to do so. Further restoring Maori 
customary use decision making rights is likely to provide this incentive. 
2'Natural injuries are in the order of 10 times less than these figures. 
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For example, some Maori argue that rahui or other customary restrictions within a traditional 
Maori ethic of conservation, are more acceptable constraints than bureaucratic impositions by 
an official Crown agency. It could be argued that rahui and tapu are not that different from 
the kinds of restrictions used by Fish and Game Councils such as bag limits and restricted 
seasons (Wright et al., 1995). As with Maori their focus is on managing species at the 
population level, rather than managing each individual within a popUlation. 
This view is· supported by some Maori pro-harvesters (Kirikiri and Nugent, in press) who 
have stated that more stringent attempts to prevent poaching might occur if iwi were given 
control of the resource because poaching would be more clearly seen to interfere with the 
tikanga philosophy and success of legitimate and sustainable customary use (in Moller, 1995, 
pI5). 
3.4 A Question of Survival 
The International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP) accepts the killing of protected 
species only where essential for the sustenance of indigenous people and where the kill is 
sustainable. RFBPS (who believe their position to be in line with that of the ICBP) argue that 
customary use of kuaka is not essential for Maori survival. However. this is only looking at 
the issue as a question of survival being equated with a 'full tummy', In my view, it is 
necessary to look at survival in a much broader sense. 
Traditionally. as well as providing the essentials of life, the harvest provided spiritual 
nourishment to the tribes (Keene, 1994. p 12). For Maori it is a part of mahinga kai, the 
practice of gathering from the wild. It is no longer necessary for Maori to harvest as a means 
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of essential sustenance, but as an assertion of 'Maoriness', and as a means of ensuring the 
traditional culture lives on (ibid.). This is comparable to a Pakeha "customary use" of many 
species. For example, many Pakeha go fishing and hunting, not because they need the food, 
but because it is a part of their culture. Therefore, I argue that to further restore the ability of -
Maori to make customary use decisions represents a key way of meeting Maori aspirations. 
King (1994), argues that this idea fits into a wider context: 
Maori are now a minority in their own country, and their cult is a minority cult. This means that they 
frequently feel a need to deliberately assert mana Maori and to consciously celebrate their identity as 
Maori. This has become a necessary strategy for spiritual and mental health, especially in view of the 
experience of colonisation which suggested to many Maori that their culture was inferior to that of the 
coloniser (p27). 
Taking this approach, it could be concluded that the RFBPS are interpreting the policy of the 
ICBP too conservatively and with too much of a preservationist perspective. I believe that by 
taking a less conservative view restoring Maori customary use decision making rights is also 
in line with the view of the ICBP. 
3.5 An Analysis of the Debate 
The debate between pro-harvesters and preservationists has mainly focused on whether a 
harvest of native bird species can be ecologically sustainable. Although this is important, I 
believe that the main issue is that the Crown currently holds all of the customary use decision 
making power. Pro-harvesters argue that Maori should further be given the right to decide 
on the customary use of species and that this was in fact promised to them under Article II of 
the Treaty ofWaitangi. Preservationists concede that Maori values must be provided for and 
that this calls for some compromise on their pari. However, they believe that DOC should 
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still exclusively hold the decision making power and that the right to customary use should 
not extend to the killing or taking of "absolutely protected" species. 
To understand the preservationist perspective one needs to go back and look at their beliefs 
on what has happened to Maori rights since the signing of the Treaty. Preservationists 
believe that Maori rights have been surrendered over the passage of time for the benefit of 
species conservation. However, chapter two showed that Maori did not surrender their rights 
and that they were extinguished (or legislatively crushed) by the Crown who enacted 
legislation without adequate consultation with Maori. This legislation failed to honour the 
Treaty and its promises of Article II and as such present management structures are in conflict 
with the partnership promised. 
Further, preservationists argue that customary use rights cannot be further restored to Maori 
because it will lead to species decline. However, it can be concluded that current 
management is not working toward conserving many native bird species and that involving 
Maori in wildlife management and customary use decision making would actually enhance 
species' conservation. Yet while preservationists acknowledge the importance of resources 
to Maori and the need to return some rights to them, they stand in the way of the Crown 
transferring any rights by arguing that use by Maori will not be sustainable. This conclusion 
does not seem to foHow. It has been acknowledged by both sides that these resources are 
taonga and it seems un1ike1y that Maori would wish to destroy their treasures through 
unsustainable use. 
3.6 Common Ground - The Road Ahead 
While initially the two perspectives on customary use appear to be polarised a closer look at 
the debate reveals that the arguments share some common ground. The most important area 
of commonality is that both parties recognise the importance of sustainability. 
Preservationists have approached this issue from the perspective that to ensure sustainability 
we need to ensure the absolute protection of each individual of each species' population is 
maintained. Pro-harvesters in tum believe that an ethic of sustainability leaves room for a 
regulated harvest of birds to the extent that the overall viability of the population is not 
jeopardised. They believe in the absolute protection of the population rather than each 
individual bird within it. This is the same principle applied by Fish and Game Councils in their 
management. 
Although there is disagreement on how the species should be protected what is important is 
that both sides agree that a bottom line exists. Translating this into policy I argue that both 
sides have a case. For some threatened species it may be that the population can only be 
protected by protecting each individual. For other non-threatened species it may be that only 
populations need to be regulated. The challenge from this observation is to take this shared 
ecological ground and fonnulate a policy. This will be explored in chapter 5. 
Both sides agree that there should be recognition of some form of Maori customary use rights 
under the Treaty of Waitangi. The main argument is whether or not this right should extend 
to the harvest of "absolutely protected" species and the right of Maori to be involved in 
deciding on the availability of materials. For Maori, customary use is not just about food, it is 
about • cultural preservation'. Preservationists argue that • cultural preservation' through the 
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right to customary use of native birds is in conflict with sustainability. However, pro-
harvesters argue that the two goals are in fact compatible and that you cannot achieve 
'cultural preservation' if harvests, if they are exercised, are not sustainable. Therefore, I 
conclude that allowing Maori the right to decide on the customary use of species will enhance 
the Maori culture and lead to the improved conservation status of many of our native species. 
The challenge is for the Crown to develop processes to convince preservationists of this. 
3.7 Conclusion 
As stated in chapter one Maori wish to have the right to legitimately harvest kuaka if they 
desire, but essentially cannot. This is because there is some tension between the legal and 
ecological requirement to protect species and the requirement to uphold rangatiratanga of 
Maori for their taonga guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi. This chapter has explored the 
role that preservationist lobbyists play in this debate. In conclusion it has shown that 
involving Maori in customary use decision making is likely to have a range of conservation 
benefits. It further identified that the parties share a common goal of sustainablity and that 
this goes hand in hand with 'cultural preservation'. Thus, contrary to the preservation 
argument ecological sustainability, 'cultural preservation' and customary use appear to be 
complimentary. The following chapter will move on to look at the tension between the legal 
requirement to protect species and the requirement to honour the Treaty by examining the 
role institutions and legislation play in this debate. 
32 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
The Treaty ofWaitangi (Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi) was negotiated in 1840 between the Crown and 
the leaders of many Maori tribes. Article II of the Treaty guaranteed Maori rangatiratanga 
over their taonga, including species of indigenous flora and fauna. Despite this guarantee there 
has been a great reluctance by the Crown both to acknowledge and to comply with the 
undertakings and promises outlined in the Treaty's three articles.21 Instead, acts and omissions 
by the Crown and its agents, have divested Maori of their rangatiratanga and deprived them of 
their rights to exercise it in relation to indigenous flora and fauna (Waitangi Tribunal, ] 992). 
This has resulted in a constant struggle over the rights to use and manage resources between 
Maori and the Crown over the ensuing 150 years. 
Acts such as the Wildlife Act, the Native Plants Protection Act 1934 and the Marine Mammals 
Protection Act 1978 claim ownership rights over resources for the Crown, and are testimony 
to the failure of successive governments in New Zealand to honour the Treaty. This is 
reflective of New Zealand's style of conservation management which is predominantly Pakeha 
in approach. For example, legislative practice allows the killing and taking of indigenous 
wildlife for certain purposes. These purposes have largely been those of predominantly Pakeha 
constituencies, whitebaiters, duckshooters, scientists, farmers and horticulturists promoting 
and protecting their investments (Marui a Society, 1995). Further, Fish and Game Councils 
21 see Appendix Two 
manage both indigenous and introduced gamebirds for recreational harvest. They are 
responsible for the maintenance, management and enhancement of these species for the 
recreational interests of anglers and hunters; 'anglers and hunters who are undeniably 
"customary users". 
Although the Treaty of Waitangi has never been made law, it is the founding document of our 
nation. One of the reasons Maori signed the Treaty was to preserve their ability to live 
sustainably. Article II of the Treaty guaranteed the protection of taonga for what they were 
used for at that time. In the case of the kuaka, this meant protecting Maori customary use 
decision making rights (Mason M, pers. comm.). Based on their understanding of the law, 
some Maori now want to exercise their Treaty rights and argue that customary use decision 
making rights need to be formally recognised and provided for by the Crown. 
In this chapter I will analyse the political and institutional framework which sets out New 
Zealand's wildlife and conservation law. I will begin by examining the body currently 
responsible for administering customary use, the Department of Conservation. I will then 
examine the legal issues. with particular emphasis on the Wildlife Act and section 4 of the 
Conservation Act. Finally I will look at how this national debate fits with New Zealand's 
international obligations as outlined by the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
4.2 The Department of Conservation 
From 1984 to 1990 the Labour government initiated a large scale reform of environmental 
legislation and administration. In 1987, as part of-the restructuring, the agencies that formerly 
had responsibility for conservation management were abolished or modified and the 
Department of Conservation was fonned under the Conservation Act 1987 (Memon, 1993, 
p49). 
In the initial years of its operation, DOC experienced major hurdles in developing a unified 
structure and philosophy. It brought together a wide range of conservation activities and 
people with different experiences and values. DOC was staffed almost entirely from the pre-
existing departments, including the Department of Lands and Survey, the Forest Service and 
the Wildlife Service. Each agency had generally followed different ethics in relation to 
resource management and conservation (ibid.). This has led to internal friction within DOC 
especially amongst inherited staff from departments that traditionally were competitive. For 
example, ex Wildlife Service staff have a strong tendency toward preservation while many ex 
Forest Service staff tend toward sustainable use22• 
This gives an indication of the hindrances faced by policy initiatives aimed toward customary 
use. For example, the majority of staff working in the Protected Species area of the 
Department of Conservation are ex Wildlife Service. Some of these people are saying "no" to 
customary use23 while those working in the Estate Protection Policy area tend toward 
sustainable use. This is reRective of the internal debate within DOC on the customary use 
issue. With internal division such as this, it is difficult for DOC to come up with a unified 
stance on customary use, or to develop any national guidelines. 
22Many fonner Wildlife Service staff are working with endangered species and'quite naturally expound a strong 
preservationist stance. Conversely many ex New Zealand ~orest Service staff are involved in ungulate control 
and management - they seek sustainable outcomes through strict control. Sometimes this control is through 
"customary use", for example. the Himalyn thar (Hughey K, pers. Cornm.). 
23For example. Kennedy E (1994) made a strong "preservationist" submission to the Southland Conservation 
Board regarding negotiations with Ngai Tahu over the Crown Titi Islands (Hughey K. pers. comm.). 
Partly as a reflection of such difficulties, the Department was reorganised three times between 
1987 and 1991 and had four Director-Generals within this period. These kinds of problems 
have raised fundamental questions about whether there is I any coherent view about the 
appropriate role for DOC (Memon, 1993). 
DOC was established as a resource management agency with a conservation advocacy role. In 
early drafts ofthe Conservation Bill the tenn 'conservation' included utilisation. However, the 
Bill was subject to. major debate. As a result of the lobbying and submissions made by various 
interest groups it was subsequently changed during the enactment process (Memon, 1993). As 
a result the Conservation Act defines conservation as: 
... the preservation and protection of natural and historic resources for the purpose of maintaining their 
intrinsic values. providillg for their appreciation and recreational enjoyment by the public. and 
safeguarding the options o/future generations (Port I. Section 2). 
While the Conservation Bin initially gave equal priorities to utilisation, preservation and 
protection the final Act places emphasis on the management of protected resources for their 
intrinsic worth. This places preservation as a higher priority than utilisation on DOC's agenda 
(Airey et aI, 1995, p 16-17). As the Act takes a preservationist and protectionist stance, the 
establishment of DOC has been interpreted as a major victory for environmentalists (Buhrs and 
Bartlett. 1993). This has led to one of the fundamental problems of the customary use debate. 
Environmental groups see DOC as an advocate for conservation and they constantly focus 
their lobbying at this preservationist position. For example, the RFBPS has criticised DOC 
staff who have publicly supported Maori customary use initiatives. 
DOC gains revenue from central government and ~esource user charges. Both of these sources 
are limited. The former. by the current government philosophy of limited national government 
intervention and their support for a user pays system, and the latter by resentment from the 
public at having to pay for the use of public resources (Memon, 1993). As well as dealing with 
budgetary constraints, DOC has been hampered by a continual reduction in staff nwnbers. 
This has affected DOC's ability to take an integrated approach to conservation management. 
For example,in the 1995 Budget DOC got a financial boost for possum control and threatened 
species management. However, this was offset by reductions in other areas. This has resulted 
, 
in a department with more funding for endangered species rescue programmes but less for the 
conservation advocacy needed to prevent the habitat loss and degradation that helps push 
species towards extinction (RFBPS, 1995b). 
This highlights the difficulties DOC is facing in maintaining New Zealand's biodiversity. A 
combination of habitat loss, predation and occasional 'illegal harvesting' is resulting in the 
populations of many species declining both regionally and nationally. It follows that politically 
we need to address these issues and arrest this decline. This calls for an integrated approach to 
conservation management where advocacy, habitat protection, predator control, threatened 
species protection and cultural values are all provided for. For example: 
In most circumstances sustainable harvests will have to be coupled with restoration effort that either 
enhances habitat quality and reproductive success or controls predation and competition from the 
introduced species (Moller. 1995. p14). 
4.3 Section 4 of the Conservation Act 
The Department of Conservation operates under a legislative mandate set out In the 
Conservation Act 1987. Section 4 of the Conservation Act states that: 
This Act shall be so interpreted and administered as to give eJJect to the principles oj the Treaty oj 
Waitangi. 
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DOC has tried a range of techniques to give effect to the Treaty. For example, the Kaupapa 
Atawhai Unit was formed in 1989 to address Maori issues within the Department and to aid in 
fulfillirig DOC's obligations under section 4 of the Conservation Act. However, the Kaupapa 
Atawhai Division is a "small and relatively powerless group within an enormous organisation. 
Recruitment of more Maori conservation officers and scientists at all levels is long overdue and 
will lead to a more bi-cultural approach to conservation,,24 (Moller, 1995b). 
The Wildlife Act, the Reserves Act 1977, the National Parks Act 1980, the Marine Mammals 
Protection Act, and the Conservation Act make provision, subject to conditions, for the 
customary use of native plants and animals2s. However, in the absence of national policy on 
customary use there is variation between regional conservancies and for requests for different 
species. Decisions at the .national level are largely made on a case by case basis. DOC's 
primary source of infonnation when considering an application comes from its scientists and 
legal advisors. Legal advice to DOC has taken a very conservative line with regard to applying 
section 4 of the Conservation Act and as a result has traditionally paid little homage to the -
Treaty. This has meant that there have been few applications for the permitted take of animals 
and even fewer examples of DOC approved use rights for any animal species. 
DOC further argues that it is in an administrative and legal bind on the issue of customary use .. 
While the Wildlife Act obliges it to prosecute any unauthorised taking of protected species, the 
Conservation Act obliges it to 'give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi'. From 
24 Currently less than 1.5 percent of DOC's staff are employed for their Maori e~pertise (Mutu, 1994). 
2ss53( I) Wildlife Act - flora and fauna 
s49 Reserves Act - flom and fauna 
s5(3) National Parks Act - plants (where provided for in the relevant management plans). 
s4( 1) Marine Mammals Protectiol1 Act - marine mammal parts 
s30(2) Conservation Act - plants (DOC. 1995b, p311). 
this conflict has developed an ongoing debate as to how much weighting section 4 of the 
Conservation Act should be accorded in the implementation of the Wildlife Act. This 
weightmg has, by default, been left up to the Courts to decide. 
4.4 The Conservation Act v The Wildlife Act - The Courts 
It has been noted that since 1840 there has been a reluctance of the Crown and its agents such 
as DOC to recognise and provide for Maori values in managing kuaka. However, the Crown 
through the enactment of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the subsequent inclusion of 
section 4 in the Conservation Act 1987 has implied the need for DOC to actively protect Maori 
values with regard to wildlife management. Parliament has been reluctant to further the debate 
and it has therefore been left to the Courts to determine the extent of these Maori rights 
(Mason M, pers. comm.). 
Historically. legal advice to DOC has been that "the Department in its administration of the 
Wildlife Act should not consider giving effect to the principles of the Treaty" (Mansfield, 
1989). This was based on decisions such as in The Police v Whetu Marama Mark Mareikura 
( 1989 ). The defendant in the case had taken some kereru but pleaded the Treaty of Waitangi 
and section 4 of the Conservation Act 1987. Although this case dealt with kereru it was' 
considered that the thrust of the decision was of general application. 
The District Court Judge did not uphold the defence, finding that any right which the Treaty 
may have given in respect of kereru had been extinguished over the years by Parliament in 
protecting kereru through various legislation culminating in the Wildlife Act 1953. The Judge 
held, although the Department of Conservation is bound by the Conservation Act to 'give 
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effect to the principles of the Treaty' when administering that Act, it is not correct to read the 
Treaty principles into the Wildlife Act: 
It may well be that the rigHt to hunt kereru for special occasio11s was a tribal tradition at the time of the 
signing of the Treaty. It may well be that Article II of the Treaty ofWaitangi preserved the hunting of 
kereru as one of the treasures over which the Maori would have rangatiratanga. But the clear 
implication is that since 1922, Parliament has passed laws extinguishing that right, in the overriding 
national interest...The Treaty may have preserved the rights of Maori tribes to hunt kereru but in my 
view, the Wildlife Act and its predecessors have extinguished such rights (reserved decision of his 
Honour Judge E.W. Unwin). 
However, on the 22 September 1995 the Court of Appeal decision in the Ngai Tahu 
Whalewatch Case was released. This decision is important because it potentially overturns a 
lot of what was previously practised. The four appellants, who may conveniently be referred 
to collectively as Ngai Tahu, challenged on Treaty of Waitangi and legitimate expectation 
grounds the Director-General of Conservation's intention to issue a further permit for 
commercial whale-watching by boats off the Kaikoura coast. 
Judge Cooke stated that statutory provisions for giving effect to the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in matters of interpretation and administration should not be narrowly construed. 
Therefore, even when emphasis is on protection of species from harm or disturbance there is 
nothing to prevent the Director-General from taking into account Treaty considerations in 
exercising his ultimate discretion. 
He ruled that by s.6 of the Conservation Act. the functions of DOC are to administer the Act 
and the enactments specified in its First Schedule. which includes the Marine Mammals 
Protection Act 1978 [and the Wildlife Act 1953]. Taking these provisions together, Neazor J. 
held that sA was a sufficient direction to make it a requirement that the Director-General 
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administer the Marine Mammals Protection Act so as to give effect to the principles of the 
Treaty. Such issues are not to be approached narrowly and the Crown is not right in trying to 
'limit those principles to cortsultation. Recognition of the Treaty principles requires 'active 
protection of Maori interests. To restrict this to consultation would be hollow. 
The judgement under appeal was vacated. It was replaced with a reference back to the 
Director-General and a declaration that, subject to the primary consideration of the 
preservation and protection of the whales, the Director-General of Conservation should take 
into account, among the factors relevant to whether or not he should grant any further permit 
for commercial whale-watching off the Kaikoura coast, protection of the interests of Ngai 
Tahu in accordance with Treaty ofWaitangi principles. 
This decision is likely to have far reaching consequences with regard to the way DOC has been 
viewing its responsibilities with regard to Section 4 of the Conservation Act. Possible ways of 
applying the direction of this decision will be discussed in chapter 5. 
4.5 Interpretation of the Court of Appeal Decision on DOC's Implementation of the 
Wildlife Act 
Although there are provisions for customary use in the Wildlife Act, DOC has traditionally 
taken a very precautionary approach to its interpretation. For example, kuaka could be 
harvested if it was specifically transferred to the Third Schedule of the Wildlife Act, wildlife 
that may be hunted or killed subject to the Ministers notification. ,This would give kuaka the 
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same status as, for example, muttonbird. To date this section has been little used to provide 
for Maori custommy use of species, although allowing this, could have conservation benefits26. 
Further, under section 44A of the Wildlife Act there are provisions for the Director-General to 
delegate his or her decision making powers27. This means that a body consisting of both Maori 
and Crown representatives could be established to decide on customary use applications. This 
provision has not been used but represents a means of involving Maori in wildlife management 
and customary use decision making. This would be more likely to result in decisions that 
reflected Maori values because under current practices the Director-General has too much 
power in the decision making process: 
I. There are no legislative directions regarding how the Director-General should consider 
each application and he or she has the power to allow, reject or impose conditions on any 
permits issued for customary use. This does not constitute a representative or adequate 
decision making body and a better bureaucratic body would consist of both Maori and 
Crown representatives; 
2. Who the Director-General consults regarding this decision depends on his or her own 
discretion. This makes it too easy for DOC scientists to be given prominence over 
traditional Maori knowledge and social values; 
3. The Director-General has the power to classify and declassify protected species at his or -
her own discretion. This does not offer enough protection to Maori as it implies that their 
customary use rights could be revoked at any time. 
26As it is accepted that customary use rights will only be exercised in a sustainable manner this would still be 
consistent DOC's. precautionary principle approach. 
27 See Appendix Three. 
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Th~ Wildlife Act makes no reference to the Treaty of Waitangi. and due to their interpretation 
of the Conservation Act, managers have accorded more weighting to protection than to 
cultural values or sustainable use. However, this interpretation has meant that DOC has taken 
a preservationist stance and this has been at the expense of DOC's obligation to 'give effect to 
the principles ofthe Treaty ofWaitangi'. I conclude that the Court of Appeal decision calls for 
a precautionary (ie. where conservation is still the over-riding priority) but positive approach 
(ie. DOC recognises it's statutory duty to actively give effect to the principles ofthe Treaty) to 
customary use. For example, the mechanisms are there for DOC to provide opportunities for 
expression of rangatiratanga in aspects of use, management, and control of resources. In the 
case of further restoring customary use decision making rights it is argued that using these 
mechanisms would lead to better conservation of species such as the kuaka. 
Further this would overcome the problems of current legislation treating Maori as just another 
interest group rather than as a partner to the Crown. Elements of good faith, reasonable co-
operation and compromise are fundamental to the concept of partnership inherent within the 
Treaty. A serious commitment to take the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi into account in 
the area of wildlife administration must extend to an effort towards a bi-cultural approach to 
procedures where appropriate. 
4.6 An International Perspective 
Suggestions for greater power sharing with iwi in conservation management are in line with 
international trends. For example, moves to greater power sharing with indigenous peoples in 
conservation management have been underway in the USA and Canada for two decades, in 
Africa over the last decade, and currently in Australia. This is part of a wider shift from a 
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strategy of imposition of a totally preservationist approach for conservation, to one of 
conservation for present and future use (Moller, 1995b). 
Several conservation gains have emerged from this approach, including active community 
involvement in conservation, a decrease in poaching, reduction in harvests to ensure 
sustainability, and especially injoint political liaisons to protect or enhance habitats (ibid.). It is 
concluded that similar conservation gains could result in New Zealand if moves toward power 
sharing were made, 
Governments are encouraged to fulfil their domestic responsibilities and enter into international 
agreements that will assist them to do so. New Zealand is a signatory to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. The Department of Conservation is the lead agency for biodiversity in 
New Zealand and has been given the responsibility of implementing the CBD. So far progress 
has been slow but the underlying assumption is that New Zealand does not have to put in place 
new laws or agencies in order to develop and implement a national strategy (Buhrs, 1995). 
The CBD lends weight to Maori initiatives to further restore customary use rights. Article 
1 O( c) of the CBD states: 
Each Contracting Pany shall. as far as possible and as appropriate: 
... Protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with the traditional Cultural 
practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements. 
As part of the national biodiversity strategy New Zealand will have to find ways of including 
customary use initiatives. The strategy could therefore, potentially represent a good 
opportunity for the Crown to take on board Maorj initiatives in fonnulating the policy. 
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The implementation of the Convention will require co-ordination and co-operation between 
existing agencies administering statutes and strategies concerned. To effectively develop and 
implement a national strategy requires common goals ahd principles, and agreed priorities such 
as those mentioned by the Department of Conservation (1994) and presented in the general 
form of policy similar to the Environment 2010 Strategy. For this to lead to conservation 
gains, honour the Treaty and remain consistent with the intentions of the CBD it is important 
that the Crown ensures lwi become involved from the outset at a national level and be given 
power in the decision making process. If this does not happen then the Convention runs the 
risks of being picked up by Crown dominated management and falling into the same traps as 
current legislation. This could mean that certain Articles of the Convention, particularly 
Article 8(j), which deals with indigenous peoples rights, and Article 1 O( c) which deals with 
sustainable use, arenot given enough weighting. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the current political environment within which Maori are seeking to 
have their customary use decision making rights restored. It has shown how DOC, the body 
responsible for administering applications for customary use has been hampered by political 
pressure, internal friction. budgetary constraints and staff cuts. It outlined how historically 
DOC has been viewing its responsibilities with regard to the interpretation and implementation 
of section 4 of the Conservation Act to the Wildlife Act too narrowly. Based on the Court of 
Appeal decision and the need for DOC to develop and implement a national biodiversity 
strategy, which makes provision for the sustainable use of resources, it can be concluded that 
the time is ripe for advancing policy and understanding in this area. Possible ways of doing this 
are the subject of chapter 5. 
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CHAPTERS 
ADVANCING THE CUSTOMARY USE DEBATE 
5.1 Introduction 
This project began with a brief historical account of the events leading up to the "absolute 
protection" of the kuaka and the extinguishment of Maori decision making powers regarding 
customary use. Chapter 3 then looked at the debate that has evolved since Maori have tried 
to further restore customary use rights and called for a greater role in decision making 
processes. Finally, chapter 4 examined the institutions responsible for administering 
customary use and the legal requirements of current wildlife policy with regard to this issue. 
The aim of this chapter is to integrate the key ideas raised in the previous chapters and 
examine the implications for future policy. I will suggest some possible strategies for 
progressing the customary use debate and in conclusion will recommend what I think is the 
best strategy and how I see this evolving. 
5.2 The Debate So Far - A Road to Build On 
It is important to briefly recap on the project so far, to outline the assumptions that will be 
made in this chapter based on my initial findings and arguments. 
Under Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi, customary use decision making rights were 
guaranteed to Maori. These rights have since been extinguished by the Crown. Currently, 
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Maori have little but want much more involvement in species management, including the right 
to decide on customary use of kuaka. 
Efforts by Maori to further restore these rights has met with powerful opposition both within 
DOC and from preservation lobby groups. Together this opposition has proved formidable 
and led to DOC taking an extremely conservative stance on customary use. 
The current management regime is failing to deliver durable and improved conservation 
outcomes, especially for mainland wildlife. A policy shift which provides for greater input 
into customary use decision making practices is seen as an effective way of addressing this 
problem. 
New Zealand is a signatory to and has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity. Under 
theCBD New Zealand is required to develop and implement a national biodiversity strategy. 
It is assumed in this project, that New Zealand's support of the CBD and DOC's lead role in 
its development, should provide an impetus to developing a strategy that recognises and 
provides for further Maori customary use decision making rights. 
5.3 Some Management Suggestions 
Based on the above assumptions, I have come up for four possible management options for 
addressing the customary use debate. Each of the suggestions will be examined and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each outlined. In conclusion, I will suggest which 
management option I think 'offers the best starting point for addressing the customary use 
debate. 
47 
5.3.1. Preservation Strategy 
It is argued by Wright et al. (1995) that there is no clear universal rationale for the present 
t mixture of use and harvest (prohibition. They state that the distinction between species 
available for use and those afforded protection is not to do with species conservation status 
but rather the division is one of cultural preference. For example, in New Zealand there are 
many fish species such as snapper [Chrysophrys auratus Forster] and orange roughy 
[Hoplostethus atlanticus] that are rapidly declining. Although harvests (including commercial 
harvests) of these two fish species are shown to be unsustainable they are still not afforded 
"absolute protection". In comparison, nearly all native bird species on which Maori 
customary use rights are focused are "absolutely protected" under the Wildlife Act. Further, 
while it is argued that it is not possible for Maori to harvest native species because of their 
conservation status, this rule does not seem to apply to predominantly Pakeha harvests. Even 
when species populations are declining, regulations are tightened, rather than absolute 
protection called for. 
Thus, it appears that "Maori as a minority have tended to be ill-served by the prevailing biases 
in management emphasis" (Wright et al .. 1995, p8). Further, Maori have incurred the wrath 
of preservationists for attempting to restore traditional rights to be involved in customary use 
decision making processes. In comparison, preservationists have not strongly opposed a 
Pakeha "customary use" of native species, even when it has been shown that these harvests 
are unsustainable. 
Moller (1995) further states that Fish and Game Councils base their environmental 
management and regulation of sports harvests on a sustainable use ethic, that is in its general 
philosophy, no different from that of sustainable customary use of indigenous wildlife (p8). 
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The irony of Maori not being afforded these same harvest rights is captured well by Moller 
who states: 
It seems ironic from a social justice standpoint that the harvesting/ofNew Zealand's indigenous spec~es 
by Maori is seen by some as unethical and a threat, whereas the same activities are not only tolerated, 
but legislated for and even facilitated. to enable a predominantly Pakeha society to harvest introduced 
species (P9). 
This raises many interesting issues. If we accept the preservation argwnent that to ensure 
sustainability we need to ensure the absolute protection of each individual of each species' 
population is maintained, then we must accept that this applies to all native species. This 
means that to be consistent, we would not only need to prevent customary use, we would 
also need to prevent the use of all native species by all ethnic groups in New Zealand. 
Further, if Maori cultural values and Treaty rights cannot be taken into account when 
considering customary use applications, it should follow, that neither should Pakeha 
commercial or recreational interests be accorded any weighting in decision making processes. 
Therefore, if a preservation strategy were to be introduced as a means of conserving the 
kuaka, it would mean that all native species, including those currently administered by Fish 
and Game Councils, must be totally protected. This is likely to have negative effects for 
conservation. For example, Fish and Game CO'Qncils might not be interested in continuing 
their protection of wetland habitats, which currently benefits a wide range of species. 
5.3.2. Status Quo 
Wildlife conservation management on land, is largely guid~d by an almost exclusively 
preservationist approach, especially where native birds such as the kuaka are concerned 
(Moller. 1995). However, it is only within the Conservation Act and the Wildlife Act that 
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preservation rather than sustainable use still predominates as the guiding philosophy. In 
contrast, sustainable use is the philosophy upon which much of the environmental planning 
and regUlation of resource use, including animal harvests from the Sea, is based by the wider 
New Zealand community (ibid. p7). 
For example, DOC allocates some areas and resources to use and prohibits the use of other 
areas and species. Regulations and legal mechanisms are used to enforce the distinction 
between what is able to be used and what is protected. In comparison traditional Maori 
values emphasise '''sustainable use' over all lands" (DOC~ 1995b, pI4): In order to retain 
customary title to the land and resources, use must occur. When conservation is needed the 
imposition of traditional controls such as rahui and tapu are used. This would seem to be in 
line with wider sustainable use practices .. 
Further, existing national legislation such as the Wildlife Act 1953, is generally interpreted so 
as to exclude any Maori involvement in customary use decision making practices. This is 
contrary to the intentions of the Treaty ofWaitangi, and therefore contrary to DOC's guiding 
legislation, the Conservation Act. This has been acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in the 
Whalewatch case. Judge Cooke stated that provision must be made by DOC to actively 
protect the principles of the Treaty when this did not jeopardise conservation. Based on the 
Court of Appeal decision, ] argue that it is no longer correct for DOC to take a 
preservationist interpretation of its responsibilities. Instead, DOC should take a precautionary 
but positive approach to involving Maori in customary use decision making. 
The status quo option would mean canymg on III our current manner. This includes 
excluding Maori from management and ownership considerations and placing the interests of 
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lobbying preservation groups ahead of DOC's responsibility to honour the Treaty of 
Waitangi. It could also mean the continuing 'illegal' and non-sustainable harvest of some 
( species, for example, the kukupa. 
5.3.3. Totallwi Control 
Although it could be argued that lwi should be returned full control over their resources, I do 
not think this is the best strategy. Under Article I of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori ceded 
kawanatanga or the right of government to make laws, including the right to impose 
conservation laws. I argue that this calls for a balance and that there is a role for an agent of 
the Crown to be involved in conservation management, remembering that customary use is 
only one aspect of any conservation strategy. 
I do not believe that conservation lobby groups or the general public would accept Maori 
being offered full ownership and decision making rights. Therefore, instead of offering a 
possible solution to the customary use debate I believe that total iwi control would further 
inflame the debate. This is because it would be difficult to convince preservationists that it is 
in their conservation interest for this to occur. As such, there would be a lot of incentive for 
these groups to challenge this management through the courts. 
Further, total iwi control would require legislative change to the Wildlife Act, the Reserves 
Act, the Native Plants Protection Act, the Marine Mammals Protection Act and the 
Conservation Act. The difficulty with changing legislation, in ~his significant way, is getting it 
onto the government agenda. I argue that this is not a government priority and that it is likely 
to take a long time for these changes to be implemented. During this process there is/likely to 
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be further species decline. Therefore, I think that a better solution would be one which 
restored further customary use decision making rights now. 
5.3.4. A Joint management Regime 
One of the most fundamental issues of the customary use debate is that the Crown holds all of 
the decision making power. An alternative approach would be for the Crown to work with 
Iwi, its Treaty partner, to develop and implement a joint management regime. 
Under a joint management regime, ownership and decision making rights with regard to 
customary use would be shared between Maori and the Crown. This would mean involving 
Maori at national, regional and local levels in management practices and customary use 
decision making. I believe that this type of management addresses the principle of redress. 
This principle states that the government is responsible for providing effective processes for 
the resolution of grievances, in the expectation that reconciliation can occur. 
A joint management practice might recognise both kawanatanga and rangatiratanga. It could 
bring together the conservation philosophy that some species need protection, alongside the 
need to incorporate Maori rights and values into management practices, rather than absolutely 
restrict the use of all species. This would be consistent with the directions implied by the 
Court of Appeal decision, where the Minister of Conservation was told that decisions 
involving Maori must provide for an appreciation of their values. 
A joint management approach has support from many conservation organisations. For 
example, WWF-NZ (1995) recognises that the desire of iwi to decide how best to meet the 
obligations that are inherent in the continued take of species for customary use is one that 
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must fonn part of· the solution. Also, there is general acceptance by the New Zealand 
Ecological Society (1995) that a partnership approach by the Crown and lwi to the 
conservation and protection of the New Zealand environment and its fauna and flora is 
required under the Treaty, and is very much to be applauded. 
It has been shown that there is no evidence of good faith consultation of iwi, before legislative 
enactments such as the Wildlife Act, expropriating Maori taonga, were passed into law. It is 
most likely, therefore, that the Waitangi Tribunal will find on claims such as Wai:262 that the 
requirements of the Treaty were not met, and that the moral basis of the Crown's ownership 
claim is dubious. Anticipating such an outcome it would seem sensible to explore possibilities 
for starting afresh in a manner which gives balanced consideration to all the Articles of the 
Treaty (Marui a Society, 1995). 
Joint management leads to equal involvement of Maori in the decision making process and is 
a good starting point for addressing the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi. Further, under a 
joint management regime, well managed customary use will lead to improved conservation 
prospects for many species, and therefore, be in both DOCs and preservationists interests. 
This creates a win:win situation for al1 of the people involved: 
Partnership and real power sharing offers the best chance for turning a lose:lose situation into a 
win:win situation for conservation and race relations (Moller, 1995, pII). 
5.4 An Evaluation of the Four Management Options 
The previous section outlined the four management options. This section aims to evaluate 
each of these options on the following criteria: 
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• widespread political acceptability; 
• institutional acceptability; 
• conservation it'nprovement; 
• international obligations. 
An evaluation of the four possible management options is presented in Table 1. The table is 
not supposed to be an exhaustive list. Rather, it aims to provide a brief summary of how each 
of the management options weighs up against the evaluative criteria. 
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TABLE 1 EVALUATIVE CRITERIA OF THE FOUR MANAGEMENT OPTIONS FOR 
CONSIDERING CUSTOMARY USE 
Management Widespread Institutional and Conservation Consistent with 
Option , Public Political ( Improvement tl,leCBD 
Acceptability Acceptability 
Likely to be Not likely to be Continuation of Inconsistent with 
opposition from accepted by DOC. present 'illegal the CBD which 
Maori and other Inconsistent with harvesting' and tends toward 
Pakeha "customary the Courts ruling likely to increase sustainable use 
Preservation users" . that DOC actively the number of rather than 
Strategy protects the species illegal absolute 
principles of the harvested. protection. 
Treaty. Removal of habitat 
Not acceptable to restoration by Fish 
Fish and Game and Game 
Councils. Councils. 
Not acceptable to Acceptable to Further mainland Is not consistent 
pro-harvesters and some DOC staff species habitat and with Article IO(c) 
some conservation but Courts have species decline. or SO). 
Status Quo groups, e.g. ruled in Continued • illegal 
Maruia Society. Whalewatch Case harvesting' . 
that the current 
interpretation of 
legislation by 
DOCi's 
inadequate. 
Not acceptable to Not likely to be Unknown. This I believe the CBD 
Total lwi Control the preservation accepted by DOC would depend on aims more for 
lobby or many staff. how iwi managed recognising 
Pakeha. Courts have ruled species indigenous peoples 
that Article II of populations and as partners rather 
the Treaty must be ecosystems. than full 
balanced with Could result in controllers. 
Article l illegal use by It is unknown if 
Not likely to be Pakeha and hence management 
accepted by Fish to further species practices would be 
and Game decline. consistent. 
Councils. 
Acceptable to the Acceptable to Help to halt Yes is consistent 
A Joint wider general. some DOC staff. current species with articles IO(c) 
Management public. Consistent with decline. and SO) and also 
Regime Likely to be the Court of Lead to improved recognises that 
accepted by Maori. Appeal conservation sustainable use 
Supported by the Whalewatch through integrated must be balanced 
majority of decision. manage,ment with protection. 
conservation Acceptable to Fish appoaches. 
groups. and Game Likely to result in 
Councils. more species 
research. 
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It is argued by DOC (1 995b ) that "the issue associated with the customary use of species is 
how to provide for the expectations of Maori people while protecting species popUlations so 
that popufations are sustained within the framework of the relevant legislation" (P311). 
Based on this, it can be concluded from table I that the best strategy is the joint management 
option. This is because it is the most likely to allow for restoration of Maori customary use 
decision making rights while yielding conservation improvements, and working within 
existing legislative frameworks. Therefore, I argue that a joint management strategy should 
be developed between Crown and Iwi. 
5.5 One Way of Developing and Implementing a Joint Management Regime - The 
National Biodiversty Strategy •. 
To further advance the idea of a joint management strategy, I suggest that a possible 
mechanism for developing an effective partnership is the national biodiversity strategy. I 
believe that the national strategy has the potential to be an effective joint management regime 
for the following reasons: 
• recognition of the need to incorporate indigenous peoples, ie. Maori; 
• recognition of the importance of biodiversity through both protection and sustainable use; 
• the strategy is the responsibility of DOC which I argue has a lot to gain both financially 
and in a conservation sense by the development of this partnership. 
Fundamental to the process of developing a joint management strategy is the role of Maori 
people: 
When we are all involved in conservation. we will all get a great~r understanding and appreciation of 
our natural. historic and cultural surroundings. and there will be a far better conservation and social 
result (DOC. 1995b. p23). 
This is a fact which has been recognised by the CBD which states for the "potential of 
indigenous communities to be realised, the cultural, social, economic and physical well-being 
of indigenous peoples must be fostered and protected" (Te Puni Kokori, 1994). Mechanisms 
are available in existing, national legislation to delegate customary use decision making to a 
body consisting of both Maori and Pakeha representatives. I argue that the biodiversity 
strategy could effectively advance this provision by establishing the framework and guidelines 
for how this joint body will be developed and managed. 
The sustainablity of species is the common goal of both 'preservationists' and 'pro-
harvesters' . Also, while the CBD encourages the sustainable use of resources, this is to be 
balanced with protection, and with the setting· aside of protected areas. I argue that under the 
biodiversity strategy it would be possible for Maori and the Crown to work together in order 
to balance customary use with protection. This compliments the provisions of the CBD, the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and the conservation criteria of protection legislation in 
New Zealand. 
I believe that DOC also has a lot to gain from the development of a partnership under the 
biodiversity strategy. Well managed customary use will lead to improved conservation 
prospects for many species and therefore be in DOC's interests both in a conservation and a 
financial sense. Therefore, I conclude that customary use is not only affordable, it is 
beneficial. 
Currently management practices exist for the delegation of rights to another decision making 
body. I argue these mechanisms should be used to delegate customary use decision making 
rights to a body made up of both Crown and Maori representatives. The national biodiversity 
strategy is still in the early stages. It is important that Maori be included in its development 
and implementation at a national level now. If this liappens the strategy should be reflective 
of the partnership agreement between Maori and the Crown, as was the intention of the 
Treaty. It should also lead to the improved conservation status of many of New Zealand's 
native species such as the kuaka. 
5.6 Where do Preservationists Fit Into This? 
It has been identified that one of the main constraints on DOC perfonning in relation to their 
Treaty obligations is the opposition of some preservationists. Despite the potential 
conservation gains and are.as of common ground in the customary use debate this group has 
maintained strident public opposition to current customary use proposals. The role of these 
groups in policy has important implications for the process, content and outcomes of decision 
making. For example, David Alexander (1994) states: 
We [RFBPS] have developed a cosy relationship with government in Wellington where we win more 
often that we lose in the campaigns we take up. 
However, it can be argued that the pre-occupation of environmentalists !n New Zealand with 
the national environment is a weakness, as they tend to overlook the social, historical, and 
political aspects of the environmental problematique. Consequently their approach to 
developing solutions can be described as narrow, pragmatic, anti-ideological, and failing in 
terms of addressing the need for change in the social, economic, and political context in which 
environmental problems exist (Tester, 1987., in Buhrs and Bartlett, ·1993). 
In a joint management regime conservation groups will still have an important role to play. 
However. the focus of their debate needs to be shifted. To begin, they should be "focusing 
on ensuring species' population preservation, rather than the preservation of each individual 
of each species of native plant and animal", Secondly. they "need to recognise hierarchies of 
importance. The areas where preservationists need to be most defensive about the taking of 
native plants and animals are those areas where the survival of the species might be placed at 
risk, or where the habitat has a high level of statutory protection intended to secure 
'pristineness' values" (Maruia Society, 1995). 
The biodiversity strategy needs to provide mechanisms for developing a relationship between 
the Crown and preservationists for negitiating successful conservation outcomes under a joint 
management regime. I argue that as part of this it would be useful for preservationists to 
form a direct relationship with iwi where I believe a lot oftheir concerns can be dealt with. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter began by outlining four possible management options with regard to addressing 
the customary use debate. An evaluation of these four options found that the best option was 
a joint management strategy . This is because this had the most potential to recognise and 
provide for Maori input into decision making practices and was likely to result in the most 
improved conservation outcome for species. The national biodiversity strategy was then 
suggested as a possible mechanism for advancing the customary use debate further. It was 
concluded that preservationists needed to form a relationship with iwi where they could 
discuss their concerns. The final chapter of this report will look at the conclusions and 
recommendations that can be made for this project. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Revisiting the Problem 
I t was stated at the beginning of this report that Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed 
Maori the "full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their taonga so long as it is their wish 
and desire to retain the same in their possession". However, since 1840 government agencies 
acting for' the Crown. have enacted legislation which has removed much of this a~thority 
including Maori customary use decision making rights. 
There is increasing lobbying by some Maori for these rights to now be restored. They have 
found many supporters among the Pakeha community. Further, international agreements such as 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, which encourages the sustainable use of resources, lends 
weight to these initiatives. The problem for government, is that positive responses to these 
initiatives will likely incur the wrath of a strong preservation oriented lobby. However, Maori 
have Treaty rights and recognition of these is now being supported in the courts. 
The problem was explored from a Pakeha perspective. This is because the Crown currently holds 
all of the customary use decision making power and has largely excluded Maori from 
management decision making processes. I t is argued that this form of management is 
contributing to some species' further decline. It was argued, that a way of helping halt this 
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decline would be for the Crown to provide for greater Maori input into wildlife management, in 
this instance, through restoring further customary use decision making rights. 
The main aim of this report, was to investigate the legal and institutional framework of the 
customary use debate in New Zealand from a Pakeha perspective, with a view to progressing the 
current impasse. The conclusions and recommendations that follow demonstrate that the 
problem, as defmed, was appropriate. Within this aim there were 5 objectives. This chapter 
briefly examines the conclusions that can be drawn from the findings of each of these objectives 
and their implications for future management. Areas for future research will be identified and in 
conclusion I will look at what this means for our trans-migratory bird visitor, the kuaka. 
6.2 The Key Findings - Objectives Revisited 
Customary use of indigenous species of flora and fauna by Maori is a long standing practice. 
Under Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi Maori were promised that their customary use 
decision making rights would be retained. However, since 1840 the Crown has enacted 
legislation which has extinguished many of these rights. The imposition of this protective 
legislation was carried out with little consultation with Maori and as such is considered to be in 
breach of the partnership implied. There is now increasing lobbying by Maori who want their 
right to decide on the customary use of species restored. Further, New Zealand has ratified the 
Convention on Biological Diversity which aims to conserve biological diversity, ensure resources 
are used sustainably and that the benefits of such use are share<! equitably. 
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It was concluded that the current management regime is failing to deliver durable and improved 
conservation outcomes, especially for mainland wildlife. Pro-harvesters argue that a way of 
helping to halt the decline is to involve Maori in wildlife management, in this instance by 
restoring their customary use decision making rights. They argue that the ability to make· 
decisions is a right guaranteed to Maori under the Treaty. They further argue that customary use 
can be sustainable, and will actually have conservation benefits for many species. 
There is powerful opposition to this idea and one of the main constraints on DOC performing in 
relation to their Treaty obligations is the external opposition from some preservation lobbyists, 
particularly the RFBPS. They argue that DOC should retain decision making power on materials 
available for customary use and that customary use rights should not extend to "absolutely 
protected" species in any circumstances. 
However, it can be concluded that these groups wrongly assume that Maori customary use 
decision making rights were surrendered over the passage of time for the benefit of species 
conservation. Maori decision making rights, were in fact. legislatively crushed by the Crown 
without adequate consultation with Maori. As such, existing legislation is in breach of the Treaty 
and the Crown's ownership and management of indigenous flora and fauna is dubious. 
Wildlife management in New Zealand has been predominantly Pakeha in its approach. For 
example, legislative practice allows the killing and taking of· indigenous wildlife for certain 
purposes. These have largely been those of predominantly Pakeha constituencies. While the 
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exercising of these Pakeha "customary use" rights is both tolerated and legislated for, the same 
harvest~ng by Maori is seen by some as unethical and a threat to species conservation. 
There is strong internal opposition within some areas of DOC regarding efforts by Maori to 
further assert their customary use decision making rights. Together with the preservation lobby 
this opposition has proved fonnidable and led to DOC take an extremely conservative stance on 
customary use. 
DOC's conservative approach to wildlife management is evident in the preservationist 
interpretation of its governing legislation, the Conservation Act. Section 4 of the Conservation 
Act requires DOC to give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. However, arguing 
that it is acting in the best interests of conservation DOC has failed to read this provision into its 
administration of the Wildlife Act 1953. This interpretation has resulted in a failure of DOC to 
recognise the principles of the Treaty, to the extent necessary to actually giving effect to them to 
the satisfaction of key Maori lobby groups. 
The debate between section 4 of the Conservation Act and its application to the Wildlife Act has 
now been determined by the Court of Appeal Kaikoura Whalewatch decision (1995). This 
decision potentially overturns much of DOC's interpretation of the legislation and concurrently 
the management practices they have employed. It was concluded that DOC was viewing its 
responsibilities with regard to section 4 too narrowly and that recognition of the Treaty principles 
requires active protection of Maori interests. As a result, DOC must act in accordance with the 
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principles of the Treaty and apply them to the administration of other legislation in the First 
Schedule. 
From this, it can be concluded that DOC needs to take a precautionary but positive approach to 
the restoration of customary use decision making rights. DOC should, therefore, use the 
opportunities that exist under s53 and 44a of the Wildlife Act to provide opportunities for the 
expression of rangatiratanga in aspects of use, management and control of resources by Maori. 
It was concluded that the time is ripe for advancing this debate politically in New Zealand. Four 
possible management options were examined. These were then evaluated on how well they 
provided for Maori customary use decision making rights while protecting species populations so 
that populations are sustained. It was concluded that a joint management regime, where 
ownership and decision making rights with regard to customary use would be shared between 
Maori and the Crown, was the best strategy. This was based on the findings that this strategy 
had the most positive outcomes for both species conservation and the recognition of indigenous 
peoples' rights. Further, as wel1 as being compatible with national legislation and the Treaty, it 
was also consistent with New Zealand's international obligations under the CBD. 
The national biodiversity strategy was proposed as a vehicle for further progressing the idea of a 
joint management strategy. It was conc1uded that the strategy, if developed and implemented in 
a partnership manner by the Crown and Maori, could potentially fulfil the criteria of an effective 
joint management regime. Firstly, it recognises the need to incorporate Maori values into 
customary use decision making practices making it consistent with the principles of the Treaty of 
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Waitangi. Secondly. the over-riding goal of the strategy is the sustainability of species. This 
makes it consistent with existing national legislation and international obligations under the CBD. 
Finally. the strategy is the responsibility of the Department of Conservation who currently has 
provisions for involving Maori in decision making processes and restoring customary use 
decision making rights to Maori. 
6.3 Implications for Future Management 
It can be concluded that the right to establish and maintain customary use comes from the ability 
to participate in the decision making process as guaranteed to Maori in Article II of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. So far enactment of protective legislation by the Crown. since the signing of the 
Treaty. has extinguished Maori involvement in decision making processes. and thus the right to 
decide on the customary use of certain species of flora and fauna. This problem has been 
exacerbated by the preservationist interpretation of the Wildlife Act by DOC and its failure to 
satisfactorily implement the principles of the Treaty. 
It is concluded that this situation cannot be allowed to continue and that it is no longer 
appropriate for the Crown to hold all of the decision making power on the availability of 
materials for customary use. Article II must be balanced with Article I of the Treaty. The effects 
on future management of this approach are as follows. 
Delegation of customary use decision making rights to another body. made up of Maori and 
Crown representatives will have positive implications for species rn,anagement. To begin. it will 
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help to halt current species decline. For example, it is likely that there win be less 'illegal 
harvesting' . Secondly, it will lead to a more integrated approach to conservation management 
because exercise of any customary use rights will go hand in hand with areas' such as habitat 
restoration and predation control. Finally, it will lead to increasing current knowledge on 
indigenous species of flora and fauna. This is because it is likely that joint management will 
encourage the sharing of scientific and traditional Maori knowledge on species' populations. 
Sharing of decision making rights between Maori and the Crown is likely to result in better 
management structures for providing for the protection of species. While DOC management is 
mainly focused at a national level, iwi management is largely based at the local level. The 
combination of these two management approaches is likely to result in a greater enforcement and 
monitoring of species than currently exists. For example, currently DOC has insufficient staff 
numbers to successfully enforce harvest prohibitions. Under a joint management regime it is 
considered that some iwi may be in a better position to enforce prohibitions. More active 
enforcement is likely to ensure that decisions made under a joint management regime help to halt 
species' decline. 
A joint management regime will mean that species are managed at a local. regional. national and 
international level. This should enable New Zealand to actively implement management practices. 
that are consistent with both international and national obligations while addressing the power 
imbalances that have plagued conservation management. 
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Understanding cultural differences is a crucial first step towards a bi-cultural approach to 
conservation management and research (Moller, 1995, pI). It is therefore imperative that the 
Crown seeks to involve iwi in the development of any strategy and the ongoing empowerment 
processes from the outset. If the Crown fails to do this, it is likely that the strategy will not 
adequately provide for Maori interests. This will mean a continuation of the status quo situation. 
This will result in continuing species decline and the on-going lobbying of Maori to have their 
rights restored. 
6.4 Identification of Future Research Considerations 
DOC needs to initiate research into the sustainable use of native species. This includes looking 
into population numbers, habitat conditions, breeding patterns and possible use thresholds. For 
this research to be useful to both the Crown and Maori, I argue that Maori, if they desire, should 
be asked to help in this research. For example, Maori may be better able to determine the extent 
of "illegal harvesting" occurring. Further, iwi research could be focused at a local level while 
Crown research could be concentrated at a national level. 
I recommend that research be undertaken to determine the benefits to conservation of a more bi-
cultural approach to conservation management. As part of this research, I argue that possible 
mechanisms for providing greater recognition of Maori values within current conservation 
institutions needs to be looked into. For example, it could be possible that there should be a 
move toward employing more Maori within DOC. It is argued that this would most likely lead to 
a more bi-cultural approach to species conservation being taken. 
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Finally. research needs to be undertaken to detennine the extent of Maori desires to reswne 
harvesting. For example. which species are iwi interested in. are there any species which it might 
be possible for them to harvest now and are'they prepared to stop current 'illegal harvests' if 
these are shown to be unsustainable. 
6.5 Implications for Management of the Kuaka 
It was stated at the beginning of this project that as part of the practice of customary use Maori 
wished to have their decision making rights to legitimately harvest kuaka restored. This final 
section of my report turns to this 'claim' to detennine what my findings and their implication for 
management mean for the kuaka. 
The kuaka is a trans-migratory bird species. I argue that if a joint management strategy is applied 
to the management of this bird it is likely to have significant benefits. To begin, New Zealand 
would be represented at international forums, such as the United Nations, by Crown 
representatives. The bird will further be managed nationally at local, regional and national levels. 
This management is likely to lead to more conservation improvements that current management 
which is primarily focused on a national and regional scale. 
A joint management regime allows for the gathering of both scientific knowledge and traditional 
Maori knowledge on the kuaka. The more we know about a species the better we are able to 
manage it. Therefore. the application of both of these sources of knowledge is likely to have 
positive outcomes for the kuaka. 
68 
A joint management regime is likely to provide incentive for Maori to participate in conservation 
lobbying. For example, Maori might lobby for the increased protection of our estuaries if they 
have a vested interest in maintaining and enhancing kuaka populations.' This would have 
significant benefits for the kuaka who is currently facing habitat losses in both their wintering and 
breeding grounds. 
Therefore, I recommend that customary use decision making rights be restored to a joint body 
consisting of both Maori and the Crown and· that they engage in on-going joint management 
practices. I further recommend that research is carried out determining what happens to the 
kuaka away for New Zealand waters. 
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GLOSSARY 
lwi: Tribe, people (Waltangi Tribunal Report (Wai 27) 1991). 
Mahinga Kai: traditional places for food-gathering and other resources. 
Rangatiratanga, te tino rangatiratanga: rights of autonomous self-regulation, iwi to make 
decisions and control resources. 
Tangata Whenua: In relation to a particular area, means the iwi, or hapu that holds mana whenua 
over that area (Resource Management Act 1991). 
Taonga: valued resources, treasures. 
Tikanga: Maori customary values and practices (Resource Management Act 1991). 
Source: The Department of Conservation (1995). Draft Canterbury Conservation Management 
Strategy, Volume One. Department of Conservation. Christchurch, New Zealand. 
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ACRONYMS 
CBD: Convention on Biological Diversity 
DOC: Department of Conservation 
ICBP: International Council for Bird Preservation 
IUCN: International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
NZCA: New Zealand Conservation Authority 
RFBPS: Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society 
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APPENDIX ONE 
SECT. 53. DIRECTOR-GENERAL MAY !\UTHORISE TAKING OR KILLING OF 
WILDLIFE FOR CERTAIN PU,RPOSES--
(1) The Director-General may from time to time in writing 
authorise any specified person to catch alive or kill for any 
purpose approved by the Director-General any absolutely 
protected or partially protected wildlife or any game or any 
other species of wildlife the hunting or killing of which is 
not for the time being permitted. 
(2) The Director-General may from time to time in writing 
authorise any specified person--
(a) To catch alive or otherwise obtain alive any absolutely 
protected or partially protected wildlife or any game or 
any other species of wildlife the taking of which is not 
for the time being permitted~ or 
(b) To take or otherwise obtain the eggs of any such 
wildlife or game, for the purpose of distributing or 
exchanging the same in any other country or in some 
other part of New Zealand, or for any scientific or 
other purpose approved by the Director-General, or for 
the purpose of rearing any such wildlife or game, or for 
the purpose of hatching any such eggs and of rearing any 
progeny arising from that hatching,--
and may in any such authority authorise the holder to have any 
such wildlife or game or eggs or progeny in his or her or its 
possession for any of the purposes specified in this 
subsection, and may in any such authority authorise the holder 
to liberate any such wildlife or game or progeny in such area 
and during such period as may be specified in the authority. 
(3) The Director-General may give to any Fish and Game Council 
any written authority that may be given under subsection (1 ) 
or subsection (2) of this section in respect of game. 
(4) Where any such authority is given to a Fish and Game 
Council. the powers that may be exercised by the Council 
pursuant to that authority may be exercised on its behalf by 
any officer or employee of the Councilor by any other person 
authorised in writing by the Council. 
(5) Any authority granted under any of the foregoing 
provisions of this section may contain such conditions as the 
Director-General may impose. Without limiting the general 
power of the Director-General to impose any conditions, the 
Director-General may in any such authority impose all or any 
of the following conditions: 
(a) Prescribing the means by which any such wildlife or game 
or eggs may be caught or killed or taken: 
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(b) Prescribing the areas in which any such wildlife or game 
or eggs may be caught or killed or taken: 
(c) Providing for the sale or other disposal of any such 
wildlife or game or eggs: 
(d) Prescribing the duranon of the authority: 
(e) Providing for the revocation of the authority and for 
the issue of any other authority in its place: 
(f) Providing for the furnishing of returns ofthe numbers 
of any such wildlife or game or eggs caught, killed, or 
taken: 
(g) In respect of any authority issued pursuant to 
subsection (2) or subsection (3) of this section,~~ 
(i) Prescribing the areas in which any such wildlife 
or game may be kept or any such eggs may be hatched and 
any such progeny reared: 
(ii) Prescribing the types of cages, runs, or other 
enclosures in which any such wildlife or game or progeny 
may be kept: 
(iii) Providing for the planting of any plants or of 
any specified kind of plants in or adjacent to any such 
cage, run, or other enclosure: 
(iv) Prescribing the areas where any such wildlife or 
game or progeny may be .liberated: 
(v) Providing for inspection by officers or servants 
of the Department at all reasonable times. 
(6) Notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this 
Act, any authority issued under this section may contain 
conditions authorising the holder to use, for the purpose of 
catching atlve or killing.any wildlife or game, any live 
decoys or any net or noose or trap or any firearm or any other 
method the use of which is otherwise expressly prohibited by 
this Act or by any regulations made under this Act. 
(7) Every person to whom any authority is granted under or 
pursuant to this section or, where the authority is given to a 
Fish and Game Council, the Council and every officer or 
employee of the Councilor other person exercising the powers 
of the Council pursuant to that authority who commits a breach 
of or fails to comply with any condition on which the 
authority was granted commits an offence against this Act.] 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Text of the Treaty ofWaitangi 
ENGLISH VERSION 
ARTICLE THE FIRST 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the 
separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the 
Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without 
reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation 
or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise 
or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof. 
. . . 
AR1"ICLE THE SECOND 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes 
of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive 
and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other 
properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their 
wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United 
Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of 
Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at 
such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons 
appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf. 
ARTICLE THE THIRD 
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives 
of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges 
of British subjects. 
Source: Office of Treaty Settlements (1995), Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty 
Of Waitangi Claims - Summary. Office of Treaty Settlements, Department of Justice, 
Wellington, New Zealand. 
7R 
MAORI VERSION 
KO TE TUATAHI 
Ko nga Rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hob kihai i uru ki 
taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini 0 lngarani ake tonu atu te 
Kawanatanga katoa 0 0 ratou wenua. 
KO TE TUARUA 
Ko te Kuini 0 lngarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu ki ng'a 
tangata katoa 0 Nu TIrani te tino rangatiratanga 0 0 ratou wenua 0 ratou kainga me 
o ratou tabnga katoa.Otiia ko nga Rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira 
katoa atu ka tuku b te Kuini te hokonga 0 era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona 
te Wenua ki te ritenga 0 te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te 
Kuini hei kai hoko mona. 
KO TE TUATORU 
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaaetanga ki te Kawanatanga 0 te Kuini. 
Ka tiakina e te Kuini 0 lngarani nga tangata maori katoa 0 Nu TIrani ka tukua ki a 
ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata 0 lngarani. 
Source: Office of Treaty Settiements (1995). Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Tre.aty 
Of Waitangi Claims - Summary. Office of Treaty Settlements, Department of Justtce, 
Wellington, New Zealand. 
____ EL-_ 
TRANSLATION OF MAORI VERSION 
(Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu) 
THE FIRST 
The Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs who have not joined that 
Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England for ever the complete 
government over their land. 
THE SECOND 
The Queen of England agrees to protect the Chiefs, the Subtribes and all the people 
of New Zea\:;md in the unqualified exercise of. their chieftainship over their lands, 
villages and all their treasures. But on the other hand the Chiefs of the Confederation 
and all the Chiefs will sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person 
owning it and by the person buying it (the latter being) appointed by the Queen as 
her purchase agent. 
THE THIRD 
For this agreed arrangement therefore concerning the Government of the Queen, 
the Queen of Eng land will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will 
give them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England. 
Source: Office of Treaty Settlements (1995). Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty 
Of Waitangi Claims - Summary. Office of Treaty Settlements, Department of Justice, 
Wellington, New Zealand. 
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CANTERBURY, N.Z. 
APPENDIX THREE 
[SECT. 44A. DELEGATION OF POWERS BY [DIRECTOR-GENERAL]--
(1) The [Director-General] may fr~m time to time, either t 
generally or particularly, delegate to such officer or 
officers or employee or employees of the Department as he 
thinks fit all or any of the powers exercisable by him under 
this Act, including the power of delegation conferred by this 
section, but, except as provided in section 44 of this Act, 
not including any powers delegated to him under any other 
provision of this Act. 
(2) Subject to any general or special directions given or 
conditions attached by the [Director-General], the officer or 
employee to whom any powers are delegated under this section 
may exercise those powers in the same manner and with the same 
effect as if they had been conferred on him directly by this 
section and not by delegation. 
(3) Every person purporting to act pursuant to any delegation 
under this section shall be presumed to be acting in 
accordance with the tenns of the delegation in absence of 
proof to the contrary. 
(4) Any delegation under this section may be made to a 
specified officer or employee or to officers or employees of a 
specified class, or may be made to the holder or holders for 
the time being of a specified office or class of offices. 
(5) Any delegation under this section shall be revocable at 
will, and no such delegation shall prevent the exercise of any 
power by the [Director-General]. 
(6) Any such delegation shall, until revoked. continue in 
force according to its tenor, notwithstanding the fact that 
the [Director-General] by whom it was made may have ceased to 
hold office, and shall continue to have effect as if made by 
the successor in office of that [Director-Genera1].] 
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